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Rhetoric and Rationality in the Law
of Negligence
Steven D. Smith*
[Ilt is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class
of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently
equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and
to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs. 1
In recent years tort law scholarship has shown an increas-
ing affection for the alluring virtues of rationality.2 One symp-
tom of this affection is the proliferation of theories of tort law3
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho. I would like to thank
Robert Ellickson, Patricia Martin, Robert Rabin, Gary Schwartz, Sheldon
Vincenti, and Robert Weisberg for their valuable commentary on earlier drafts
of this Article.
1. ARasToTLs, Nichomachean Ethics bk. 1, ch. 3, in THE NiCHOMACHEAN
ETHIcs OF ARsmTOTLE 3 (D. Ross trans. 1925).
2. See, e.g., Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern
American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (1980); Rodgers, Negligence Recon-
sidered The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1980).
The concern with rationality is not limited to tort law scholarship. Profes-
sor Bruce Ackerman depicts contemporary legal thought generally as a conflict
between traditional methods-what Ackerman labels "Ordinary Observing"-
and the increasingly ascendant approach that Ackerman calls "Scientific Poli-
cymaking." B. AcdEPAN, PRrVATE PROPERTY AND THE CoNsTrrtrno (1977).
Rationality is at the core of Ackerman's Scientific Policymaking. Thus, believ-
ing the rules and principles of the law to form "a self-consistent whole," id. at
11, Ackerman's policymakers "insist upon articulate theoretical consistency."
Id. at 172-73. Ackerman regards much of the recent work in the area of tort law
to be an instance of this general trend. Id. at 274 nn.9, 11 & 12; cf. B. AcKEntAN,
RECONSTRUCTING A MERcAx LAw (1984) (favoring a new mode of legal discourse
that Ackerman refers to as "legal constructivism").
3. Although this Article makes no attempt to describe the various com-
peting theories in detail, it may be useful to identify briefly the principal theo-
retical "schools." Tort law theories are sometimes classified into those that
assume that the law should promote efficient allocation of resources and those
concerned with establishing a system of corrective justice based on moral val-
ues. See . RABiN, PERsPECTr~vs ON TORT LAw 155, 237-39 (2d ed. 1983). The
economic efficiency school has as its foremost proponents Professor Guido Cal-
abresi and Judge Richard A. Posner. See, e.g., G. CALABREs, THE COSTS OF Ac-
CIDENTS (1970) [hereinafter cited as CALABREsi, COSTS]; Calabresi, Optimal
Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Cala-
bresi, Accidents]; Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory
of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REv. 851 (1981); Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Comment]; Posner, A The-
ory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STuD. 29 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Posner, The-
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that, although divergent in many respects, are similar in their
efforts to unify tort law in a comprehensive and rational frame-
work.4 Although aspiring to an increasingly comprehensive ra-
tionality, tort law commentators have evinced a growing
disaffection for the doctrine of negligence.S This disaffection is
not a symptom of any general trend away from negligence and
its conceptual underpinning, the idea of reasonableness;( in-
deed, the disaffection comes at a time when courts generally
appear to be expanding the domain of negligence.7 Thus, the
theoretical disapproval of negligence deserves further scrutiny.
Perhaps the most pervasive criticism of negligence law is
that it fails to achieve its ostensible objectives. Critics contend
that negligence law does not effectively reduce accident costs8
and that it offends community conceptions of corrective jus-
tice.9 Other critics argue that because negligence doctrine is
conceptually indeterminate, it involves the courts in problems
ory]. A recent contribution to this school of analysis is Grady, A New Positive
Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799 (1983). The moral or corrective
justice school is most prominently represented by Professors Richard A. Ep-
stein and George P. Fletcher. See, e.g., Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas
in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1965 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Epstein, Defenses]; Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Epstein, Theory]; Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in
Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. Rv. 537 (1972). This classification of theories, al-
though perhaps making for some unlikely bedfellows, is useful and will be fol-
lowed in this Article.
4. Englard observes that "the common denominator among the otherwise
very different outlooks ... is the fundamental belief in the rational foundations
of law and in the feasibility of a systematic theory or model." Englard, supra
note 2, at 30.
5. The writings of Professors Calabresi, Epstein, and Fletcher, see supra
note 3, evidence this growing dislike of negligence doctrine. None of these
leading American tort law theorists favors the existing negligence regime.
Judge Posner may seem to constitute an exception to this generalization. How-
ever, Posner's defense of negligence doctrine, see Posner, Theory, supra note 3;
Posner, Comment, supra note 3, is based on the assumption that negligence
doctrine can be described by the so-called "Learned Hand test," by which inju-
rious conduct is considered negligent if the magnitude of the injury discounted
by the probability of its occurrence exceeds the costs of its prevention. See
Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 884; Posner, Theory, supra note 3, at 32. If, as
argued herein, the Learned Hand test does not describe the practical meaning
of negligence doctrine, then Posner's writings in effect suggest that negligence
be replaced by efficiency analysis.
6. The law defines "negligence" as the failure to exercise the care ex-
pected of a "reasonable" person. See W. PROSsER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
TORTS § 32, at 149-51 (4th ed. 1971).
7. See Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the
Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and
the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv. 963 (1981).
8. See, e.g., CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 3, at 244-65.
9. See generally Epstein, Theory, supra note 3; Fletcher, supra note 3.
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that they are ill-equipped to solve. The doctrine is, thus, a
"process flaw"o and a violation of rule of law."
Underlying each criticism is an implicit conception of ra-
tionality against which negligence law is evaluated. When
these conceptions are isolated and examined, however, their
applicability to tort law appears questionable. This Article crit-
icizes those conceptions and suggests an alternative conception
of rationality that illuminates the attraction of negligence doc-
trine and explains why recent tort theorizing has diverged so
markedly from the direction taken by courts.
Part I of this Article sketches briefly the conceptions of in-
strumental and logical rationality that are implicit in recent
criticisms of the negligence regime. Part II describes an alter-
native vantage point from which to examine tort law, an "inter-
nal perspective." It then outlines another version of rationality,
"rhetorical rationality," that is suggested by the internal per-
spective. Part Ill applies the concept of rhetorical rationality
from the internal perspective to demonstrate how negligence
doctrine functions in thought and language as a valuable tool
for resolving disputes. Parts IV and V reexamine the criticisms
of the negligence system and the conceptions of rationality on
which those criticisms are based.
L VERSIONS OF RATIONALITY
Contemporary criticisms of existing negligence doctrine
are premised on particular conceptions of what it means for a
legal system to be rational. Two versions of rationality, as well
as a hybrid variation, can be abstracted from these criticisms.
A. INsTRUmENTAL RATiONALrrY
The conception of instrumental rationality implicit in re-
cent comprehensive theories of tort law pervades modern
thinking.' 2 The instrumental version of rationality is premised
on the assumption that the law exists to further identifiable
goals or values. Once such goals are ascertained, a substantive
10. See Henderson, Process Constraints in Torts, 67 CoRNELL L Rsv. 901,
919-22 (1982).
11. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 468.
12. See H. PuTNAm, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 179 (1981) (characterizing
instrumental rationality as "powerfully appealing to the contemporary mind").
See generally id. at 174.88. Professor Robert S. Summers describes the domi-
nant philosophy in American law as "pragmatic instrumentalism." Summers,
Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law,
92 HARv. L. REv. 433, 433 (1978).
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legal doctrine such as negligence should be judged by its effi-
cacy in promoting such goals. Thus, a doctrine is rational if it
effectively furthers the ends of the law.13
This conception is most conspicuous in the tort theories of
Professor Calabresi and Judge Posner, who explicitly suggest
that the goal of tort law is to reduce the sum of accident and
accident prevention costs.14 The "moral" or "corrective justice"
theories of Professors Epstein and Fletcher are less overtly in-
strumentalist. A close examination, however, suggests that the
moral theories are founded primarily on the view that the pur-
pose of tort law is to protect individual autonomy.' 5 That value
provides a touchstone for evaluating particular tort doctrines; a
satisfactory tort principle is one that furthers individual auton-
omy. Thus, the instrumentalist conception is implicit in the
theories of Fletcher and Epstein as well as in those of the eco-
nomic theorists.
13. See Summers, supra note 12, at 437-38, 447.
14. See, e.g., CALABRESI, CosTs, supra note 3, at 26 (asserting that it is "axi-
omatic that the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the
costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents"); Posner, Theory, supra
note 3, at 33 (asserting that "the dominant function of the fault system is to
generate rules of liability that if followed will bring about, at least approxi-
mately, the efficient-the cost-justified-level of accidents and safety").
Professor Calabresi, it should be noted, recognizes that other goals, such as
fair wealth distribution, and other values, such as justice, may also properly in-
fluence tort law. See, e.g., CALABRESI, CosTs, supra note 3, at 24-33, 293-300; Cal-
abresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFsTRA L.
Rsv. 553 (1980).
15. See Epstein, Theory, supra note 3, at 198; Fletcher, supra note 3, at 568-
69.
Professor Schwartz, although noting the paucity of any proffered justifica-
tion for Fletcher's theory, interprets both Fletcher and Epstein as attempting to
distill the principles of responsibility contained in ordinary language and mo-
rality. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 990-91. Certainly there is language in Profes-
sor Epstein's scholarship to support this interpretation, but such an
interpretation fails to explain the ambitious scope and prescriptive purpose of
the corrective justice theories. Common morality and language are unlikely to
form a cohesive and comprehensive system of responsibility. See B. ACKEn-
MAN, supra note 2, at 90, 95. Epstein and Fletcher, however, aim to construct
such a system, and they seem quite willing to depart from common morality if
the demands of rationality so require. Epstein in particular rejects defenses to
which community morality might well be sympathetic, such as insanity, coer-
cion, or practical necessity. Epstein, Defenses, supra note 3. But cf. 0. HoLmEs,
THE COMMON LAw 109 (1831) ("But if insanity of a pronounced type exists,
manifestly incapacitating the sufferer from complying with the rule which he
has broken, good sense would require it to be admitted as an excuse."). Thus,
although ordinary morality serves as a starting point for Epstein, his funda-
mental aim is to build a system around the value of individual autonomy. See,
Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply To Two Critics, 8 J. LEGAL
STuD. 477, 479 (1979) ("The justification for [my] principles is quite simply a be-
lief in the autonomy and freedom of the individual.").
[Vol. 69:277
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The theories predicated on the instrumental version of ra-
tionality condemn existing negligence doctrine.1 6 This is
hardly surprising. Since the negligence doctrine is too indefi-
nite logically to dictate any certain result in an individual case,
it is highly unlikely that the doctrine, in the aggregate, would
lead to results consistent with any particular goal or value. By
this view, therefore, negligence law offends rationality because
it is instrumentally inefficacious.
B. LOGICAL RATIONALITY
To Professor James Henderson, rationality represents not
merely a criterion for judging the legal system but the essence
of the system itself. "Adjudication," he notes, "is a social pro-
cess of decisionmaking in which the affected parties are guar-
anteed the opportunity of presenting proofs and arguments to
an impartial tribunal which is bound to find the relevant facts
and to apply recognized rules to reach a reasoned result."1
7
Moreover, although Henderson's discussions contain instru-
mentalist passages,18 and although he tacitly acknowledges
that there may be more than one species of rationality,19 he in-
dicates that the legal system requires a particular kind of ra-
tionality, one having the character of logical demonstration.
Thus, like the Aristotelian formulation of deductive logic,20
Henderson's analysis focuses on the necessary and inexorable
quality of legal rationality. "Each litigant," he explains, "is
promised the opportunity to rely on rules that, he can argue,
not only support but require the result that he urges on the
court."21 The constraints of rationality thus ensure the pres-
ence of a "single right result in each case." 22
Henderson's insistence on necessary reasoning and a sin-
gle correct conclusion provides only a skeletal conception of ra-
tionality. Far from fleshing out the picture, his analysis serves
rather to obscure it. Henderson offers a description of the ra-
tional character of the legal process to support his argument
that the law cannot deal satisfactorily with '"polycentric"
16. See supra note 5.
17. Henderson, supra note 7, at 469 (emphasis added).
18. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 10, at 904-05, 911-15.
19. For instance, Henderson acknowledges that managerial problems,
which he believes unsuitable for resolution under rule-bound methods proper
to courts, may nonetheless be amenable to "rational" solutions. Id. at 909.
20. See AiSTOTuo, POSTERIOR ANALYTics, bk. I, ch. 6 (J. Barnes trans.
1975).
21. Henderson, supra note 10, at 908 (emphasis in original).
22. Henderson, supra note 7, at 469.
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problems, problems requiring the consideration of multiple and
interdependent factors. 23 The relationship between logical ra-
tionality and "polycentricity," however, is problematic. Some
polycentric problems may be susceptible of solutions that have
the inexorability of logical demonstration, 24 while problems
with no apparent polycentricity may defy any strictly logical so-
lution. The ordinary automobile accident case, for which Hen-
derson apparently considers the negligence doctrine
appropriate,25 presents problems that cannot be solved by
strict logical reasoning.
Henderson's preferred example of a polycentric problem,
the medical malpractice suit,26 further confuses his conception
of rationality. Malpractice cases are not inherently either more
or less '"polycentric," nor are they more or less susceptible to
logical solution, than more traditional tort actions. Such ac-
tions merely involve factual matters that are less familiar to lay
persons. 27 Judges and jurors are better able to evaluate the
reasonableness of a driver's behavior than of a doctor's surgery
because they themselves drive but do not perform surgery.
In view of these difficulties, it is tempting to interpret Hen-
derson as suggesting only that some cases are too complicated
to be resolved through the judicial process. This interpretation,
however, would have nothing to do with the necessary quality
of legal reasoning. The concept of "polycentric" problems, a
central concept of Henderson's analysis, would illustrate at
most one kind of dispute that is often too complex for courts to
resolve. Moreover, if Henderson's analysis is reduced to mean
only that courts and juries are ill-equipped to solve factually
complicated problems, his position would pare away a good
portion of the civil case dockets-complex antitrust and securi-
23. See id. at 475-77; Henderson, supra note 10, at 907-08.
24. Professor Lon Fuller, from whom Henderson borrowed the concept of
"polycentric" problems, see Henderson, supra note 7, at 475 n.23, offers as an
example the engineering problem of determining the proper angles in the con-
struction of a bridge. See Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARv. L. REV. 353, 403 (1978). Although the problem is complex and presents
interdependent questions, the angles for a given bridge can be determined with
mathematical precision.
25. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 478-79; Henderson, supra note 10, at
923.
26. See Henderson, supra note 10, at 923-24; see also Henderson, supra note
7, at 480 ("Perhaps the best example of a case recognized by courts from the
beginning to involve potentially threatening levels of polycentricity is that in-
volving the alleged negligence of a physician rendering treatment.").
27. See Culley, In Defense of Civil Juries, 35 ME. L REV. 17, 22 (1983) (ob-
serving that malpractice cases are not significantly more complex than other
personal injury cases except with respect to the use of expert testimony).
[Vol. 69:277
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ties fraud cases, for example-before touching even relatively
complicated tort cases.28
It seems appropriate, therefore, to accept Henderson's in-
sistence on the logical, inexorable quality of legal reasoning.
By this view, negligence doctrine, with its underlying concept
of "reasonableness," transgresses the canons of rationality be-
cause it does not allow courts to reach results in a wholly logi-
cal fashion.29
C. A HYBRID: THE RULE OF LAW AS A CONDITION
OF RATIONALITY
Although Henderson's writings present a conception of log-
ical rationality, his references to the ideal of "rule of law"30 and
his extensive reliance on the work of Professor Fuller3' suggest
another conception of rationality, a variation that combines ele-
ments of the instrumental and logical versions of rationality.
Fuller attempted to elaborate a set of criteria, an "inner
morality,"32 to which law must adhere if it is to function as law
at all. Although he described these criteria as "procedural nat-
ural law,"33 Fuller explained and defended them largely in in-
strumental terms, asserting that "some minimum adherence to
legal morality is essential for the practical efficacy of law."34
Unlike contemporary tort theorists, however, Fuller did not
identify particular substantive objectives that the law should
28. Arguably, malpractice cases are precisely the kind of cases that, with
the aid of expert testimony, can be readily brought within the comprehension
of judges and juries. See id.
29. It is unlikely, of course, that any tort doctrine could measure up to this
standard of rationality. Henderson suggests that the problem of indeterminate-
ness could be alleviated by replacing negligence with strict liability. See Hen-
derson, supra note 10, at 922. However, as Henderson admits elsewhere, even a
true system of strict liability would give rise to enormous problems of delineat-
ing the boundaries of persons or activities that would be subject to strict liabil-
ity. See Henderson, The Boundary Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 Mo. L
REV. 659 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Henderson, Enterprise Liabilityl. Such
problems of demarcation might well generate as much uncertainty, and conse-
quent discretion, as does negligence law.
The possibility and desirability of a logical model of judicial rationality has
been the subject of considerable discussion during much of this century. For
an overview of these criticisms and responses, see P. WASSERSTROM, THE JtI-
cIAL DEcisioN 13-38 (1961). See also Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought 90
YALE L.J. 970, 995-97 (1981).
30. See Henderson, supra note 7.
31. See Fuller, supra note 24; see also I FuLLER, THE MoAu.rry or LAw
(1964) [hereinaftdr cited as L. FULLER, MoRALrrY].
32. L FULLER, MoR.Lr, supra note 31, at 42.
33. Id. at 96.
34. Id. at 156.
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
promote. Rather, his central concern was to facilitate rational
behavior by those individuals subject to the law. Thus, the var-
ious criteria that constitute the law's "inner morality"-promul-
gation, clarity, consistency, and constancy35-are calculated to
enable individuals to comprehend what it is that the law re-
quires of them and to make rational decisions consistent with
those requirements. 36
Henderson endorses Fuller's view. Like Fuller, Henderson
describes a set of criteria to which the law should conform, jus-
tifying such criteria, in instrumental terms, as "the conditions
necessary for tort law to guide both primary and adjudicative
behavior."37 Henderson declines, however, to identify particu-
lar substantive objectives that the law must serve, 38 and he ex-
pressly denies that the rule of law rests on a purely
instrumentalist foundation, arguing instead that the idea is
"rooted in notions of the dignity and responsibility of human
individuals." 39 To Henderson, dignity encompasses rationality.
Thus, the assumption fundamental to the law is that "the per-
sons to whom the rules are addressed are intelligent enough to
understand the rules and responsible enough to conform their
conduct to them."4 0
Henderson and Fuller view law as the condition of rational-
ity in society. The logical character of the law has an instru-
mentalist function; it facilitates rationality by removing
uncertainty from legal rules and by eliminating discretion in
legal authorities. As a consequence, individuals ascertain what
is and is not lawful and act accordingly.
Henderson does not distinguish his ideal of "rule of law"
from his conception of logical rationality. These ideas are, how-
ever, subtly different.4 1 Logical rationality concerns itself with
35. Id. at 49, 63, 65, 79.
36. Fuller explained that the morality of law is based on a view of the indi-
vidual as a responsible agent. See id. at 162-63. This view attributes to persons
the capacity to make and carry out rational decisions. Fuller contrasted this
view with that implied by differing psychological theories such as behaviorism.
See id. at 163-64.
Professor Owen Fiss has criticized Fuller's conception of rule of law and
adjudication. See Fiss, The Supreme Court; 1978 Term: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1, 39-44 (1979).
37. Henderson, supra note 10, at 904.
38. Henderson elsewhere assumes, however, that tort law should serve the
objectives favored by efficiency theorists. Henderson, Extending the Bounda-
ries of Strict Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of the Second Best,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1041 (1980).
39. Henderson, supra note 10, at 917.
40. Id. at 918.
41. Fuller observes that adjudication often involves reasoning that does
[Vol. 69:277
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the formal question of whether the law satisfies impersonal cri-
teria of logical reasoning, whereas the "rule of law" philosophy
insists that the law be certain and comprehensible to those per-
sons who are subject to it. The latter requirement conceivably
might be at once both more and less demanding than the for-
mer. Rules applicable in a purely logical way might be difficult
for people to comprehend,42 yet many people might be able to
understand and apply standards, guidelines, or rational consid-
erations in ways that are not strictly logical. Thus, it is helpful
to consider logical rationality and the idea of "rule of law" as
related but not identical versions of rationality.
I. AN ALTERNATIVE VERSION: THE RATIONALITY
OF RHETORIC
"Rhetoric," when applied to legal scholarship, often is not
intended as a term of praise. This section, however, regener-
ates the term and suggests that it offers a version of rationality
that may be more useful in tort law than the conceptions of ra-
tionality considered previously.
A. THE INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE: TORT LAw FROM
THE INSIDE OUT
Most contemporary theorists critical of the negligence sys-
tem view tort law from an "external perspective." In under-
standing the functions of tort law, as well as in evaluating its
performance, theorists frequently play the role of an outside
observer, one who is not personally involved in the legal pro-
cess and who can assess the social effects of law or of a particu-
lar legal doctrine. A different perspective, however, is
available. By imaginatively placing oneself in the position of a
participant in a tort action, one can assume an "internal
perspective."43
not operate deductively but rather seeks to "trace out" the implications of
"shared purposes." See Fuller, supra note 24, at 380-81.
42. Acknowledging this possibility, Henderson would recognize "process
constraints" in addition to logical rationality. Such constraints would require
comprehensibility, verifiability, conformability, and manageability. See Hen-
derson, supra note 10, at 911-16.
43. Professor Fiss uses the terminology of internal and external perspec-
tives to describe evaluations made from inside and outside an "interpretive
community." See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. Rav. 748-49
(1982). It is not at all clear whether the participants in a lawsuit, whose per-
spectives are considered in this Article, would constitute an "interpretive com-
munity." Thus, the terminology used herein may not be entirely consistent
with the meaning Fiss may have intended.
1984]
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The internal perspective offers a different viewpoint from
which to analyze tort law.44 A theorist who perceives tort law
from the inside out is able to discern features of the legal pro-
cess that are inconspicuous to the outside critic. Several of the
differences inherent in an internal perspective deserve special
attention.
1. The centrality of the dispute
Although it is clear from any viewpoint that the tort system
functions by resolving disputes, for the inside viewer the dis-
pute is the primary reality upon which all other features of the
legal process are based. The litigants are in court only because
they have a dispute, and when the dispute is disposed of they
will disappear back into the out-of-court world. The dispute is
also of fundamental importance to the judge; the judge's office
has been created because disputes arise.45
From an internal perspective the dispute is primary. Two
other significant phenomena, the out-of-court problem or wrong
and the substantive law, are of secondary importance. The al-
leged out-of-court wrong, of course, gives rise to the dispute
and constitutes its subject matter. Nonetheless, the partici-
pants in a legal proceeding are concerned primarily with the
dispute and only secondarily with the out-of-court wrong. This
priority is apparent from two facts. First, from the perspective
of a participant in a lawsuit, the dispute unquestionably exists,
even though the out-of-court wrong may not. The ultimate
judgment in the case may be that no wrong has occurred,
either because the defendant did not in fact do what was al-
44. This is not to suggest that the two perspectives are necessarily antago-
nistic. A comparison to the field of economics illustrates the point. Economics,
like tort law, is concerned with a highly decentralized system of decision mak-
ing in the distribution of goods. Each individual decision has only a negligible
effect on the overall allocation. Thus, although economists appropriately study
aggregate factors such as general rates of inflation, employment, and invest-
ment, such aggregates are the result of numerous individual transactions made
by individual persons and firms, and those transactions are themselves worthy
of study. Ideally, the study of decision making on a micro level would comple-
ment macroeconomics. See generally E. WENTRAuB, MICROFOUNDATIONS: THE
COMPATABILITY OF MICROECONOMICS AND MACROECONOMICS (1979); THE
MICROECONOIIC FoUNDAIONS OF MACROECONOICS (G. Harcourt ed. 1977).
Similarly, although it is appropriate to study the general effects of tort doctrine,
the doctrine is of course developed and applied by judges and litigants in indi-
vidual lawsuits, and their perspectives also merit attention.
45. See P. DEviN, THE JUDGE 3 (1979) (defining law as "a civilized method
of settling disputes"); Fuller, =upra note 24, at 372 ('The object of the rule of
law is to substitute for violence peaceful ways of settling disputes."). But cf.
infra note 49.
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leged, or because what the defendant did was not wrong. Thus,
the dispute is necessarily real while the out-of-court wrong may
not be.
Second, even a real out-of-court problem or wrong does not
necessarily result in a dispute of which the legal system must
take cognizance. A wronged party may decide to suffer in si-
lence46 or to settle the matter without any judicial determina-
tion of rights or relief.47 In either case the court need not
concern itself with the out-of-court wrong. An out-of-court
wrong, therefore, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condi-
tion of a dispute. And, unless a wrong manifests itself as a dis-
pute, it has no existence in the internal world of the law.
The dispute is also prior in importance to substantive lia-
bility rules in the sense that rules are made and invoked in re-
sponse to the demands generated by disputes.48 This priority
presents a means-end dichotomy: the resolution of the dispute
is the end toward which a legal action is directed, whereas the
applicable liability rule is merely a means for achieving that
end.
However obvious from an internal perspective, these priori-
ties will likely be overlooked or reversed by one who views the
legal process from a distance. As current tort theories illus-
trate, the external perspective is likely to focus on the func-
tional relation between the out-of-court problem or wrong (the
accident-caused injury, for example) and the applicable liabil-
ity rules, hardly pausing to appreciate that the only operative
function of liability rules is to resolve disputes. Thus, the ex-
ternal perspective reverses the order of emphasis suggested by
the internal approach. Out-of-court problems and the liability
rules applicable to them receive priority; the need to resolve
disputes, though unquestioned, receives scant attention. Simi-
larly, the external perspective turns the means-end dichotomy
inside out. Insofar as the existence of a dispute is a necessary
condition for judicial action, disputes become merely the
means for implementing the ends ostensibly reflected in sub-
stantive liability rules.4 9 An external critic may even search for
46. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
47. Most disputes that do result in the filing of a lawsuit are settled before
trial. See infra note 125.
48. From an external perspective, of course, this relationship may be re-
versed-rules of liability may be seen as generating disputes.
49. For Professor Fiss, for instance, "courts exist to give meaning to our
public values, not to resolve disputes." Fiss, supra note 36, at 29. Thus, dis-
putes provide "occasions for judicial intervention," and dispute resolution is
simply the '"mode of judicial operation." Id. at 29-30 (emphasis in original).
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ways to facilitate disputing so that such implementation can be
more thorough.50
2. Cognizance of context
The second peculiarity of the internal perspective follows
directly from the first. For the internal viewer, the law exists
only in relation to particular disputes. Unlike the external
viewer, whose examination can extend to the entire tort system
(and perhaps beyond), the internal viewer establishes his or
her horizons with reference to the immediate dispute. Thus,
the extrinsic values or broad social goals that the tort system
may exist to serve are less visible to the internal viewer. The
internal viewer, however, is more immediately aware of other
contextual factors that impinge on the law.
The insider perceives the law not as consisting of an ethe-
real body of abstract rules, but rather as operating in particular
factual and procedural situations. A judge or jury applies the
law to the specific facts of each case, and although certain facts
may be ultimately irrelevant to the resolution of the dispute,
the judge or jury still considers the facts and decides whether
they are relevant. The omnipresence of the particular factual
setting precludes disembodied thinking about liability rules in
the abstract.5 1 It also precludes any notion that substantive
Fiss, of course, is primarily concerned with constitutional adjudication, but he
extends his analysis, somewhat hesitantly, to "traditional common law cases."
Id. at 29.
50. Thus, Posner, who treats damage awards as incentives that induce pri-
vate plaintiffs to enforce the law, suggests that government must bear some of
the costs of adjudication because otherwise "the amount of litigation might be
too small." R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYsis OF LAw 321-22 (1972), see also Pos-
ner, Theory, supra note 3, at 77-91; Shavell, The Social versus the Private Incen-
tive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982).
51. The weight of context, and the elusive importance of the particular
facts, are suggested evocatively in Professor John Noonan's essay on "rhe Pas-
sengers of Palsgraf':
Why are Helen Palsgraf's children relevant to the judgment any more
than the color of her hat? . . . If they are not relevant to the judgment,
why are they relevant to the history of the case? But such impatient
questions assume that the historian will agree with Cardozo. As Fuller
observes, as he defends the "skeletonizing" of cases, reduction of the
facts "is a delicate business, and necessarily anticipates the analysis
which will be applied to the simplified situation." Facts which cannot
be shown to be crucial to the disposition of a case are important in
grasping how person affected person; Mrs. Palsgrafs children, Car-
dozo's preeminence, and others I have stated are among them. Even
details which are purely extrinsic to any participant in the process
have an effect on the understanding of the case. The day of the acci-
dent was "hot"--a detail of consummate irrelevance in terms of any
legal principles but suggestive of the circumstances in which urban
users of public transportation need to travel, a reminder of the inno-
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law exists in a vacuum. Although a judge may distinguish be-
tween substantive and procedural law for some limited pur-
poses, substantive doctrine always arises in a procedural
context, such as a motion to dismiss or a debate over jury in-
structions, and is always wedded to procedural questions in-
volving, for instance, burdens of proof or sufficiency of
pleadings. For the internal viewer this context-specific slant
underscores the mutual interdependency of, and the conse-
quent need for a functional "fit" between, substance and
procedure.52
3. The criteria for evaluating substantive rules
Although both outside and inside viewers of tort law expect
a substantive liability rule to produce "correct" results, their
criteria for determining what results are "correct" inevitably
differ. An outside critic identifies goals that the system should
promote or values to which it should adhere. Whether these
criteria consist of specific policy goals, such as efficiency or in-
dividual autonomy, or of more formal attributes of logical ra-
tionality, they provide an objective standard that exists outside
the confines of any particular case and against which the law,
and the result in a given case, can be judged.5 3
From an internal perspective, by contrast, the particular
dispute looms large and the ostensible extrinsic goals of the
cence of Helen Palsgrafs seaside excursion. How such a fact should
affect the outcome is nondemonstrable, yet it will play a part in the
process by which judgment is reached.
J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw 141-42 (1976).
52. Current tort theorizing, by contrast, has given only cursory attention to
the interrelationship between substantive doctrines and procedural rules and
to the possible value of procedure in itself-what one scholar has called "pro-
cess values." Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Process-A Plea for
"Process Values," 60 CORNsLL L. Rv. 1, 3 (1974). Procedure is most often
treated under the rubric of cost of administration. See, e.g., CALABREst, COSTS,
supra note 3, at 28, 225-26, 251, 255-59; Posner, Comment; supra note 3, at 209;
Epstein, Theory, supra note 3, at 188. But cf. infra note 97.
Professor Henderson has pointed out the neglect of procedure in recent
tort law analysis. See Henderson, supra note 10, at 902-16. Henderson, how-
ever, does little to correct the imbalance. Purporting to adopt a "process per-
spective," Henderson argues that "process constraints" have shaped the
substantive content of certain tort principles. Id. Henderson's use of the term
"process" is puzzling, however. His so-called "process constraints," such as
"comprehensibility" and "conformability," id. at 911, 914, do not seem to be pro-
cedural considerations. Rather, they are formal but nonetheless substantive re-
quirements for legal rules. Certainly, both "form" and "procedure" are often
used as the other term of a dichotomy, the first term of which is "substance."
But it does not follow that "formal" requirements are necessarily "procedural"
(or "process") constraints.
53. See Summers, supra note 12, at 447.
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legal system are at best remote. Deprived of any objective
outside reference point, the inside viewer is skeptical of state-
ments labeling a given rule or result "right" or "correct." A re-
sult cannot be simply "right"; it can only be "right" for litigants
whose disputes courts resolve.5 4 Since for the internal viewer a
commendable decision is one based on, and defensible in terms
of, values that the litigants accept,5 5 the internal perspective's
criterion for evaluating substantive law can be described as
"fairness-in-context."
Several implications of this criterion require elaboration.
First, the criterion does not lend itself to distinctions that may
be pertinent in other contexts, such as those between subjec-
tive and objective values or between individual and community
values. From an internal perspective, the purpose of the law is
to resolve disputes, not to solve philosophical problems. Thus,
the law cares about the values held by the litigants. The liti-
gants will tend to believe, however, that values are perfectly ob-
jective. They will argue that a particular result is not merely
"distasteful to me" but is "unfair." Similarly, the court's atten-
tion likely will be focused on the immediate litigants, not on
the broader, less-definable "community." This does not mean,
however, that the court will choose to be governed by the liti-
gant's values rather than by those held in the community as a
whole. In most cases, the distinction will be erased in dis-
course regarding what is "fair."5 6
If the criterion of "fairness-in-context" is insensitive to con-
siderations that might seem urgent to an outside critic, it is
54. In a similar vein, Lord Devlin, whose understanding of the law reflects
his long experience in viewing the legal system from the internal perspective of
the judge, asserts that legal institutions exist to minimize civil disorder by
resolving disputes and that "their value to the community is to be measured by
the extent to which they do this and not by the extent to which their judge-
ments and verdicts are pleasing to the critical eye." P. DEVLIN, supra note 45,
at 4.
55. It is obviously unlikely that the judge will be able to render a decision
that is pleasing to all parties. If such a result were available, the parties would
have reached it without going to court. The judge, however, may be able to find
or fashion a legal principle that all parties accept, so that the decision turns
only on disputes of fact. Even if such a principle is not available, the judge
may seek to base a legal decision on values that all parties accept at some level,
even though the parties may disagree on the proper ordering or application of
those values.
56. Observing that the law seems able to solve problems that history and
philosophy cannot, Professor Martha Minow notes that "[t Ihere is rather some-
thing in the sinews of legal reasoning that allows its decisionmakers to reach
and justify their decisions without disclosing the depth of the problem at
hand." Minow, Book Review, 92 YALE LJ. 376, 389 (1982) (reviewing M. GLEN-
DON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981)).
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acutely aware of contextual factors that the critic might over-
look. Just as there is no universal objective criterion for deter-
mining whether a result is correct, there can be no a priori test
for determining what facts are relevant to a decision.5 7 Thus, in
seeking to arrive at a fair decision, the judge must consider all
the facts that the parties may deem pertinent to the contro-
versy. In addition, the fairness of a decision depends not only
on its substantive grounds but also on the procedures by which
it is reached. A substantive liability rule, therefore, must be
compatible with procedures that are themselves accepted as
"fair."58
The internal perspective also implies a reversal in the pri-
ority of decision and justification.5 9 Tort theorists tend to con-
cern themselves primarily with determining how disputes
should be decided. Justification is a derivative task. A proper
justification presumably is merely an exposition of the reasons
for the decision. The internal perspective, with its concern for
the parties' sense of fairness-in-context, reverses this empha-
sis. Merely deciding a case is not difficult. The judge will know
at least two possible ways to decide a dispute by merely read-
ing the complaint and the answer. The difficult task, however,
is reaching a decision that can be justified or rendered "fair-in-
context." Thus, the availability of an adequate justification
may determine the decision, rather than vice versa.60
This emphasis on justification requires the judge to con-
57. See supra note 51.
58. The lay litigant may well assess the fairness of a decision largely by
the procedures through which it was reached. Values such as a right to one's
"day in court" and to trial by jury may count for more than the merits of a sub-
stantive liability rule. Professor William H. Simon has described the similarity
between this perception of procedural justice and the attitudes people take to-
ward games:
The game is a social phenomenon in which the satisfactory quality of
the outcome depends almost entirely on the proper implementation of
procedures. People usually feel that when the rules are followed the
outcome of a game is just, precisely because the rules have been fol-
lowed. They usually are not inclined to assess outcomes in terms of an
independent set of criteria.
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 Wis. . REV. 29, 104. Simon points out that under this view, even apparent
arbitrariness of results "is a virtue which proves the integrity of the system."
Id. at 104-05. Arbitrariness thus dispels any suspicion of systemic bias.
59. The distinction between decision and justification is elaborated in R.
WAssERsTROz, supra note 29, at 26-28.
60. Cf. P. DEvLN, supra note 45, at 198 ("The judicial function is not just to
render a decision. It is also to explain it, wherever explanation is possible, in
words which will carry the conviction of its rightness to the reasonable man
whom in his mind the judge should always be addressing.").
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sider the available means of persuading the parties that a re-
sult is fair and to evaluate a liability rule in terms of its
persuasive potency. Thus, it is appropriate to consider the role
of rhetoric, or the "art of persuasion," 61 in legal reasoning.
B. RHETORIC AND RATIONAuTY
Rhetoric, like logical rationality, has its historical roots in
Aristotle's formulation of deductive logic. 62 Although rhetoric
was widely associated with sophists, noted for their ability and
unscrupulous willingness to show that black was white and
white was black,63 Aristotle maintained that rhetoric, far from
being mere verbal trickery, is an art with its own laws and
methods, closely akin to logic.64 Logic is concerned with proof,
and since rhetoric uses proof as a method of persuasion, it in-
corporates logic.65
Rhetoric, however, goes beyond logic in at least two signifi-
cant respects. First, because rhetoric encompasses practical
questions that cannot be answered with logical certainty, it is
not confined to necessary demonstration as a method of per-
suasion. 66 Second, rhetoric is concerned not only with the ob-
jective validity of arguments, but also with the effects of
arguments on listeners. Thus, a rhetorical method cannot be
evaluated in the abstract but must be examined with respect to
a particular audience.6 7
Aristotle recognized that rhetoric is a neutral tool, an in-
strument capable of being employed on either side of a contro-
versy.68 He contended, however, that the constraints of
rhetoric are likely to favor results that are desirable for the
simple reason that "things that are true and things that are bet-
61. The definition is Aristotle's. ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric bk. 1, ch. 1, in TlE
RHETORIC AND THE POETICS OF ARISTOTLE 24 (F. Solmsen ed. 1954).
62. See id.
63. This unflattering portrayal of the sophists pervades Plato's dialogues.
See, e.g., Sophist 231d-235c; Meno 91a-92b; Gorgias 456a-45Th, 456c; Greates Hip.
pias 282c, collected in THE DiL&LOGUES OF PLATO (B. Jowett trans. 4th ed. 1953).
64. ARISTOTLE, supra note 61, at bk. I, chs. 1, 2.
65. See id. at bk. 1, ch. 2.
66. See id. Aristotle states:
There are few facts of the "necessary" type that can form the basis of
rhetorical syllogisms. Most of the things about which we make deci-
sions, and into which therefore we inquire, present us with alternative
possibilities. For it is about our actions that we deliberate and inquire,
and all our actions have a contingent character; hardly any of them are
determined by necessity.
Id. at bk. I, ch. 2, 28-29.
67. See, e.g., id. at bk. II, ch. 22.
68. Id. at bk. I, ch. 1.
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ter are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and
easier to believe in."69 A consummate rhetorician conceivably
may be able to persuade the audience that white is black, but it
is certainly easier to prevail in arguing that white is white.
Aristotle's analysis of rhetoric suggests a conception of "ra-
tionality" that is remarkably consistent with common usage.70
A "rational" person is simply one who considers and acts on
the basis of reasons, not necessarily one who has developed
any formal algorithm for decision making.71 Similarly, a "ra-
tional" decision is simply one based on sound reasons. Like
rhetorical arguments, such reasons may operate with inexora-
ble logic, but they need not and, given the uncertainty that per-
vades most practical matters, usually will not. 2 Reasons
usually can be given for alternative decisions or courses of ac-
tion. Thus, although people may seek to base their decisions
on sound reasons, they generally do not expect such reasons to
lead them to a single, unquestionably correct result. They
nonetheless value rationality because, as Aristotle said of rhet-
oric, careful consideration of reasons is thought to have a ten-
dency to lead to the "true" and "better" decision. 3
Rhetoric, as well as the conception of rationality that it
generates, is compatible with the internal perspective of tort
law. Both deal with concrete individual problems, and both
achieve their objective by persuasion. Just as an exercise in
rhetoric must be judged not by the objective validity of its argu-
ments but by its effect on the audience, so the decision in a
lawsuit must be evaluated, from an internal perspective, not by
any objective criteria but rather by its fairness as perceived by
the persons affected. Moreover, both tort law and rhetoric are
context-specific. Rhetoric must choose methods suitable for a
particular audience; law must take account of the particular
facts, parties, and procedures of an individual dispute. These
parallels suggest the possible value of what may be called the
conception of rhetorical rationality. 4
69. Id. at 23.
70. Aristotle assumed that the rhetorician would be speaking to an un-
trained but nevertheless reasoning audience. See id. at bk. I, ch. 1, 19-22; bk. I,
ch. 2, 24-28.
71. Philosophers and scientists, however, appear to be moving toward a
similar view. See L PTrrNA, supra note 12, at 125 ('Today, virtually no one be-
lieves there is a purely formal scientific method."). See generally id. at 174-200.
72. See supra note 66.
73. See ARISToTLE, supra note 61, at bk. I, ch. 1.
74. Cf. Minow, supra note 56, at 389 (describing law as a '"rhetoric of
rights").
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III. THE RATIONALITY OF REASONABLENESS
From an internal perspective, the critical test for negli-
gence law is its persuasive potency, its power to render deci-
sions of particular disputes fair-in-context. Since negligence
law is, in Fletcher's phrase, the "paradigm of reasonable-
ness,"7 5 this question requires an examination of the concept of
"reasonableness."
A. REASONABLENESS AS A FORMAL CONCEPT
Critics often observe that the concept of reasonableness is
highly indeterminate.7 6 The concept, however, is indeterminate
in a specialized sense, and an examination of that sense ex-
poses the source of the concept's effectiveness in the adjudica-
tive process.
Terms can be considered indefinite, and thus functionally
indeterminate, when they are not sufficiently specific to be use-
ful in the context in which they are expected to serve.77 The
75. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 556.
76. This criticism is at the core of Henderson's attack on the negligence
doctrine. See Henderson, supra note 7; Henderson, supra note 10, But the ob-
jection is hardly unique to critics holding a conception of logical rationality.
Holmes, despite his celebrated denial that logic is the life of the law, see 0.
HOLMES, supra note 15, at 1, was troubled by the negligence doctrine's capacity
to produce divergent results in factually similar cases. Id. at 122-29. He admon-
ished courts to use precedent to develop greater specificity in negligence law,
lest "all our rights and duties throughout a great part of the law [be left) to the
necessarily more or less accidental feelings of a jury." Id. at 126. Although
Holmes, as a judge, tried to follow this admonition, see Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), the courts generally have not, see, e.g., Pokora v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (suggesting that standards of conduct
should be drawn from facts of life rather than from rules of law).
77. For instance, if I tell you, "I am moving to the Midwest," you will have
trouble trying to look me up next year. I can avoid the problem by substituting
a similar but more specific term: "I am moving to 1234 First Street, Topeka,
Kansas." The terms "the Midwest" and "1234 First Street, Topeka, Kansas" are
alike in kind-both refer to known places-but one is simply more precise than
the other and, for that reason, more determinate.
Formal concepts are essential to avoid the classic conundrum that other-
wise would afflict every practical or academic inquiry. Since the inquirer does
not know the answer to the inquiry, how will the answer be recognized when it
is encountered? The problem is clearly described by Plato in the following
dialogue:
MENO: And how will you investigate, Socrates, that of which you
know nothing at all? Where can you find a starting-point in the region
of the unknown? And even if you happen to come full upon what you
want, how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not
know?
SOCRATES: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a
tiresome dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot in-
quire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does
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concept of "reasonableness," however, does not seem to be in-
determinate in this sense; it is not necessarily too imprecise to
be useful Although a computer programmed to comprehend
formal logic and dictionary denotations of words might be un-
able to decide whether a driver who zigzags rapidly from lane
to lane acts "unreasonably," a judge or jury would draw that
conclusion without the slightest intellectual strain.
The concept of reasonableness is indeterminate because it
is a "formal concept." Formal concepts describe, in form but
not in content, the objective of an inquiry. A student of ethics,
for example, may be unsure about what constitutes "good" but
will know that what is being sought will answer to the formal
description "good." Similarly, an aesthetic philosopher may
not understand what makes something "beautiful" but will
know that "beautiful" describes the object of the inquiry. Con-
cepts such as these---"beauty," "truth," and "goodness"-de-
scribe an objective, but they do not indicate what the material
content of that objective is. In that sense, these concepts are
indeterminate.7 8 They are, after all, formal concepts. "Reason-
ableness" is also a formal concept: it describes a valued attri-
bute of individual or social conduct, but it does not set forth the
actual conduct itself.
Two characteristics of formal concepts are significant for
purposes of this Article. First, because they are free of content,
formal concepts have the capacity to eliminate disagreement
and produce accord, at least on one level. If you make a state-
ment of value with substantive content--'The government
should act to promote economic prosperity"--I may disagree.
If, however, you make a statement of value that is purely for-
mal--'The government should do what is good"-I can hardly
quarrel with you (although I may observe, of course, that your
statement does not say very much). People may disagree
about what constitutes "goodness," "truth," and "beauty," but
they are unlikely to reject the values themselves.
The second significant characteristic of formal concepts is
that they are capable of subtly assuming substantive content in
appropriate contexts. If you and I not only believe, but also
know we both believe, that "good" is "pleasure," then between
not know; for if he knows, he has no need to inquire; and if not, he can-
not; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to inquire.
Plato, Meno, 80d-80e in THE DIALoGuEs OF PLATo (B. Jowett trans. 4th ed. 1953).
78. "Destination" is another more common example. The word always de-
scribes the place to which a person is going yet never tells what or where that
place is.
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us the terms "good" and "pleasure" become almost synony-
mous. In fact, even though a skilled inquisitor might prove that
your understanding conflicts with mine in subtle ways, we may
both use the term "good" thinking we mean the same thing-
pleasure.79
Reasonableness is a potent rhetorical device because it is a
formal concept. Like all formal concepts, reasonableness is
content-free and, consequently, has a unifying capacity. It sup-
plies a criterion of judgment with which no one can sensibly
disagree, since to do so would place one on the side of "unrea-
sonableness." Like other formal concepts, however, reasona-
bleness also has the chameleon-like ability to incorporate
specific values or judgments that happen to be shared by peo-
ple in a given context. For instance, most people in our society
would be able to pass from the idea "Mary was zigzagging
down the street" to "Mary was driving unreasonably" without
even noticing that any mental step was necessary to get from
the first idea to the second. The concept of "reasonableness,"
therefore, can be as full of, or as free from, specific substantive
content as the situation allows.
The concept of "reasonableness" is thus able to justify re-
sults in a way that can at least appear responsive to the sense
of fairness held by competing litigants, even when their specific
values diverge. This unifying capacity, shared by all formal
concepts, may be purely verbal. From an internal perspective,
however, the object of law is to resolve disputes and thus a ver-
bal unity is preferable to actual conflict.80
The unifying capacity of the "reasonableness" concept, as
well as its limitations, can be clarified by considering the con-
cept's operation in opposite "ideal" communities. Assume that
one community has a comprehensive and specific set of notions
about "fairness," "fault," "blame," and "responsibility." No one
in the community disagrees with or even questions these no-
tions. Disputes presented in this community can be resolved
under a "reasonableness" principle because the principle will
be understood to include the shared notions of the commu-
79. Of course, if our disagreement becomes overt, then the term "good"
will lose its substantive content and again become a purely formal concept, but
it will continue to be accepted by us both. I will argue that what you call plea-
sure is not "good." But we will still agree on the desirability of "good,"
whatever that is. To do otherwise would amount to arguing, absurdly, that
"good is not good."
80. The more troublesome question is whether a verbal unity will satisfy
the parties' sense of fairness. See infra text accompanying notes 82-88.
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nity.8 1 Although some might suggest that such a community
should frame liability rules that expressly incorporate the com-
munity's specific values, the choice of wording of the rules
makes no difference in effect. Since the community's values
are uniformly shared, the values will be considered synony-
mous with "reasonableness." 82
Consider now the other, more troublesome extreme of a
community so pluralistic that it has no consensus about any
specific values whatsoever. Disputes in such a community can
still be decided on a "reasonableness" criterion. Although in
this context "reasonableness" becomes a purely formal concept
without substantive content,8 3 it still is, precisely because it is a
formal concept, a ground of decision with which no one can
plausibly disagree.
To be sure, the use of the reasonableness concept in this
radically fragmented community poses serious problems. Al-
though the concept of reasonableness itself may be free of sub-
stantive content, the actual decision maker, the judge or jury,
may be forced to choose among more specific substantive judg-
ments and values in order to decide whether the conduct in
question was "reasonable." Thus, deciding cases under a rea-
sonableness criterion may only conceal, without solving, the
problem of choosing between competing values. Moreover, liti-
gants may perceive that reasonableness is merely a facade for
the behind-the-scenes value choices that are being made.
These problems prompt several observations. First, regard-
less of whether it would be preferable for the community to
81. Cf. Fuller, supra note 24, at 374 (suggesting that vague legal standards
like "fair practice" are most useful where there is a "strong sense of commu-
nity" based on "generally shared notions of right and wrong").
82. It might seem that in such a unified society disputes would not occur at
all. However, even though everyone agreed about values, and thus about the
principles and rules that should govern the imposition of liability, disputes
would nonetheless arise from factual disagreements. Although legal scholar-
ship naturally focuses on questions of law, the public as a whole may view the
law as a given and regard the problem of resolving factual disagreements as the
principal reason for the existence of courts.
83. Compare, however, the observation of Professor Hilary Putnam:
We are committed by our fundamental conceptions to treating not just
our present time-slices, but also our past selves, our ancestors, and
members of other cultures past and present, as persons, and that
means, I have argued, attributing to them shared references and
shared concepts, however different the conceptions that we also attri-
bute... However different our images of knowledge and conceptions
of rationality, we share a huge fund of assumptions and beliefs about
what is reasonable with even the most bizarre culture we can succeed
in interpreting at all.
H. PTuNAm, supra note 12, at 119 (emphasis added).
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make an overt public choice among competing values, the rea-
sonableness concept is applicable precisely in those situations
in which no such choice has been made. If a legislature has en-
acted a statute superseding negligence law in a given area, for
example, then the courts will of course follow the statute.8 4 For
a court, however, to adopt overtly values that are not generally
shared in the community and that have not been approved by
the community's representative institutions would certainly
jeopardize the court's pretensions to neutrality. This would un-
dermine the possibility of rendering decisions that will be per-
ceived as fair.8 5
Second, litigants may indeed perceive that the application
of the "reasonableness" concept involves choices among more
specific substantive values and, as a result, they may not be
satisfied that a decision is fair. In reality, however, this is an
observation not so much about the "reasonableness" concept
as about the community itself. When a community is deeply
divided about nearly all basic values, it obviously will be diffi-
cult, whatever the liability rule, to resolve disputes in ways that
appear fair to opposing litigants. Indeed, a community so di-
vided probably faces disintegration. Nonetheless, so long as
the community and the courts continue to exist, the courts
have no choice but to resolve as best they can those disputes
that are presented.
Even in such a pluralistic community, the concept of rea-
sonableness offers the greatest likelihood for successful resolu-
tions. The concept's very lack of specificity facilitates the
accommodation of competing values in ways that may be ana-
lyticaly unseemly but practically useful. Few cases present an
"all or nothing" situation, and the openness of the reasonable-
ness concept to competing values or judgments may enable the
judge or jury to fashion a compromise that is partly responsive
to antagonistic positions. 86 Such compromises allow a court at
84. Professor Calabresi has recently challenged the assumption of statu-
tory supremacy over common law doctrine. See G. CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). Calabresi's proposals do not, however, pur-
port to describe existing judicial practice. Moreover, even Calabresi would per-
mit courts to revise or set aside statutes only under very limited conditions.
See id. at 120-45.
85. See Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L REv. 374, 382-83, 427-28
(1982) (noting the importance traditionally attached to judge's "impartiality").
86. For instance, even before the adoption of comparative negligence, ju-
ries were notorious for rendering compromise verdicts in negligence cases. See
Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours ofa Controversy, 43 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 70 (1980); cf Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases:
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least to assuage, if not to satisfy entirely, all parties' sense of
fairness.
Moreover, from an internal perspective it may be discreet
to protect specific value choices behind a facade of "reasonable-
ness."8 7 Since a court usually has various legal and factual ave-
nues for reaching a result, a decision justified only in general
"reasonableness" terms, though perhaps not deeply satisfying
to any of the participants, at least provides no firm basis for a
litigant to conclude that the case was decided on the basis of
unacceptable values.
Finally, even if a court spells out its specific value choices,
the decision may be marginally more palatable to the disap-
pointed litigant if those choices are linked to the general crite-
rion of "reasonableness." Although the litigant will still
disagree with the court's judgment, the decision has been
placed within a general rationale that the litigant does accept.
A decision that appears to be merely a misapplication of a
sound basic principle may be more acceptable (or unacceptable
on a less fundamental level) than a decision that seems flatly
hostile to the litigant's essential values.
Thus, although no liability rule is likely to function
smoothly in a deeply divided community, the "reasonableness"
expedient may be even more necessary in such a community
than in one characterized by consensus. 88 Most actual commu-
nities will fall somewhere between the two ideal types de-
scribed. Consensus will exist with respect to some values but
not with respect to others, and the degree of consensus will
vary from time to time and from issue to issue. The reasona-
Let's Not Rush to Judgment 80 Mc. L. lav. 68, 82 (1981) (discussing the jury's
role as agent for effecting "compromises between interest groups").
87. The value of judicial candor has recently been the subject of debate.
Compare G. CALABPEsi, supra note 84, at 172-81 (arguing for greater candor)
with Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist" Statues and the New Legal
Process, 35 STAN. L REv. 213, 249-56 (1983) (criticizing Calabresi's proposal for
greater candor). Although suggesting that it may often be impolitic for a judge
in resolving individual cases to lay bare the reasons for a decision, this Article
does not address the broader implications of the "candor" debate.
88. It is not surprising, therefore, that negligence doctrine seems to blos-
som during periods that experience a deterioration in consensus about social
values. Professor Robert Rabin has argued that negligence doctrine became
the dominant tort doctrine during a time in which industrialization had under-
mined traditional status roles and left social relations in turmoil Rabin, The
Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretaion 15 GA. L.
Ruv. 925, 960-61 (1981). Similarly, the recent expansion of negligence liability,
see supra note 7, approximately coincides with a period that has experienced.
or at least has become conscious of, a decline in consensus regarding some cen-
tral societal values.
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
bleness concept will assume as much or as little content as the
context of a particular dispute permits. "Reasonableness" will
exert its power to unify on the most specific level available.
The "reasonableness" concept is thus an embodiment of
rhetorical rationality. The concept ensures that a dispute will
be decided in accordance with reasons. Such reasons, however,
need not assume any narrowly defined logical form, nor need
they be relevant to any ostensible extrinsic goal. Indeed, the
law itself neither supplies the reasons nor establishes objective
criteria for judging the relevance of reasons. Whether particu-
lar facts or considerations should bear on the "reasonableness"
of the conduct in question depends on the values and judg-
ments of the persons-litigants, judge, and jurors-involved in
an individual lawsuit.
B. REASONABLENESS IN CONTEXT: THE PROCEDURAL SETING
The internal perspective requires that substantive rules be
viewed in their procedural context. An overview of the proce-
dural law applicable to tort cases reveals the functional fit be-
tween the doctrinal concept of reasonableness and existing
procedural law.
Reasonableness is a formal concept the substantive con-
tent of which is defined by the values held by those involved in,
or affected by, a dispute. Current procedures facilitate this "de-
fining" function by allowing the parties substantial freedom to
determine the facts and issues upon which a controversy is de-
cided. This freedom has both exclusive and inclusive functions.
Because the system is adversarial, rather than inquisitorial,
facts and issues will not be considered by the court unless the
parties choose to present them. Liberal procedural rules, how-
ever, give the parties much freedom to discover, develop, and
present virtually any fact or issue they deem pertinent.8 9
The open-endedness of current pleading, discovery, and ev-
identiary rules reflects a striking functional congruity with the
open-endedness of negligence doctrine. Negligence requires
89. The Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure represent a body of
current procedural rules that provide litigants a great deal of discretion in de-
fining the scope of the controversy. For example, parties may generally assert
as many claims or defenses as they desire. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)-(c), 18(a).
Alternative pleading of inconsistent claims and defenses is permitted routinely.
See FED. R. Crv. P. 8(e) (2). The scope of relevance under discovery rules is ex-
pansive, see FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b), as is the definition of relevance applicable at
trial, see FED. R. EviD. 401. And although technical limitations on admissibility
of evidence persist, the limitations are commonly subject to numerous excep-
tions. See FED. R. EviD. 801-04 (hearsay rule and exceptions).
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the parties to supply the substantive content, and procedural
rules permit the parties to do so by presenting whatever argu-
ments seem appropriate in the particular context. Liberal pro-
cedural rules, of course, do not require open-ended substantive
doctrines-the applicability of current procedural codes is not
limited to negligence cases. The inverse proposition, however,
is more doubtful An open-ended substantive rule such as neg-
ligence would seem out of kilter with a procedural code that
placed significant restrictions on what the parties could plead
and prove. Thus, at the very least, negligence law and current
procedure evince a clear compatibility in function.
A second feature of current procedural law that warrants
attention is the law's preference for allowing juries to resolve
disputes. The preference for juries is evident in the rule that
offers a jury trial to any party who requests it,90 in recent judi-
cial decisions that have narrowed rules precluding jury trials in
equity cases, 91 and in the standard that emphatically discour-
ages judicial resolution of controversies at a pretrial stage.92
The jury may be preferred to the judge for many different rea-
sons. Nevertheless, the important role of the jury in tort law
provides another example of the functional fit between proce-
dural law and negligence doctrine.
The jury's role, according to the standard description, is
simply to accept the law as explained by the judge and apply
that law to the facts, resolving factual disputes under the bur-
den of proof rules contained in the judge's instructions. 93 In a
negligence case, however, the judge's instructions to the jury
are inherently incomplete. The jury is told to decide whether
the defendant's conduct was "reasonable," but since "reasona-
bleness" is a formal concept, the substantive content of the in-
struction must be filled in by the litigants and, ultimately, by
the jury.
The jury is an ideal institution to perform this "filling in"
function. Because it normally consists of individuals from the
community in which the litigants are themselves members, the
90. FED. P. Civ. P. 38(a), (b).
91. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
92. A court is entitled to grant summary judgment, thus precluding a jury
trial, only if it can conclude, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of the that
party, that there is no genuine issue that might require jury resolution. See
FED. L CIv. P. 56; 10A C. WRiGlT, A. MILLER & M KANE, FEDERAL PRACICn E AN
PROCEDURE § 2727, at 121-25 (2d ed. 1983).
93. See, e.g., Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 95 (1931).
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jury is likely to share values held by the litigants, and the liti-
gants are likely to perceive that this is so.94 The jury also has
the ability to make illogical but pragmatically valuable accom-
modations among competing values. This ability derives not
only from the fact that the jury does not have to explain its de-
cision publicly, but also from the likelihood that all values that
have any substantial support in the community will be repre-
sented on a multimember jury. Finally, insofar as it is useful to
conceal actual value choices that must be made, the jury's gen-
eral verdict is a useful instrument for doing so. Thus, the appli-
cation of an open-ended doctrine like negligence virtually
demands a representative institution like the jury.
In contrast to the foregoing discussion, recent theoretical
tort scholarship criticizes existing procedural law. Theories
emphasizing considerations of economic efficiency generally
favor the assignment of responsibility for accidents on a cate-
gorical basis, thus rejecting both the case-by-case method and
the use of juries.95 Theories that view the function of tort law
as providing corrective justice between individuals would seem
more congenial to the case-by-case method. To the extent that
"corrective justice" theories specify the criteria governing lia-
bility with greater exactness than does negligence law,96 how-
ever, they appear to render liberal pleading and discovery
rules, and even the institution of the jury, largely unneces-
sary.97 The prominent features of present procedural law,
94. Some litigants, of course, may have idiosyncratic values. Yet the fair-
ness of a decision based on community values may be acknowledged even by a
person who does not share those values. In order for any kind of civilized soci-
ety to exist, a community must determine that some kinds of behavior are
wrong or impermissibly injurious. Although an individual member of the com-
munity may disagree with the community's judgment, the individual may none-
theless be able to accept it by recognizing that acquiescence in such
community judgments is part of what it means to live in a community.
95. See CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 3, at 161, 255-59, 286. Posner initially
argued that juries were well-suited for making efficiency calculations, see Pos-
ner, Theory, supra note 3, at 51-52; but he has since retreated from that position,
at least with respect to contemporary juries, see Landes & Posner, supra note 3,
at 917; cf. Henderson, Enterprise Liability, supra note 29, at 693 (noting the in-
compatibility of enterprise liability with idea of "tailor-made justice in every
case"); Rodgers, supra note 2, at 10 (noting "the inadequacy of the private law-
suit for making broader social calculations").
96. Epstein's theory, for instance, would leave causation as virtually the
only issue in most cases by eliminating both the requirement that a plaintiff
prove negligence and a number of common defenses.
97. Epstein, for example, expresses admiration for, and would borrow fea-
tures of, the older English procedural system that was much more focused, and
thus more rigid, than the existing procedural system for civil litigation. See Ep-
stein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. Cm. L REv. 556 (1973).
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therefore, appear faulty when viewed from an external
perspective.
Current procedures seem sensible, however, when one
views tort law from an internal perspective. If the law's pri-
mary aim is to resolve individual disputes in accordance with
the disputants' sense of fairness, then liberal procedures that
foster individual decision making are consistent with that
aim.9 8 Moreover, prevailing procedural law shares the negli-
gence doctrine's conception of. rhetorical rationality because
both the procedural and substantive law are calculated to facili-
tate the presentation of those reasons that the parties deem
pertinent, without circumscribing such reasons by imposing
formal or instrumental constraints on admissibility.
IV. NEGLIGENCE AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE LAW
The "internal perspective" demonstrates the compatibility
of negligence doctrine and the concept of reasonableness with
a conception of rhetorical rationality. This section reexamines
the conceptions of rationality in the recent criticisms of the
negligence doctrine.
A. NEGLIGENCE AND INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY
A number of modern tort theorists espouse an instrumen-
tal view of tort law and criticize negligence doctrine for failing
to achieve the law's ostensible objectives-efficient reduction of
accident costs or individual autonomy.9 9 If these are indeed
the objectives of tort law, the criticism is powerful. From an in-
ternal perspective, however, the instrumentalist assumption
that tort law has identifiable extrinsic objectives is
questionable.
1. How a tort doctrine can have an objective
Normally "objectives" are attributed to persons who are ca-
pable of purposive thought and behavior, not to things such as
"tort law." Statements about the "objectives" of "tort law" thus
could be considered crude anthropomorphic nonsense. This
conclusion by itself, however, seems trivial. People, after all,
often create or use tools for particular purposes, and it is com-
mon to speak loosely of such purposes as belonging to the tools
98. Even if current procedures are efficacious, they may be simply too
costly to maintain. This Article does not seek to assess this latter criticism.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
1984]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
themselves. Nonetheless, the conclusion highlights a point that
must be kept clearly in mind. If a statement that a tool has a
certain purpose means anything intelligible, the meaning is not
that in some metaphysical sense the purpose inheres in the
tool; nor does the statement mean simply that the person has
or intends the purpose. Rather, the statement means that the
person has the purpose and intends the particular tool to be
used for that purpose.OO
One who says that tort law has a particular objective,
therefore, cannot mean simply that the objective is a "good
thing." Few would question that reduction of accident costs or
preservation of individual autonomy are generally worthy am-
bitions, but that does not mean they are the "objectives" of tort
law. The instrumentalist's assertion must mean something
more. It must mean that judges, the persons who make and ad-
minister the law,'O' intend it to serve such objectives.10 2 This
point, although obvious, is frequently forgotten. Discussions of
the "purpose" or "objectives" of legal doctrines often imply that
the doctrines themselves somehow harbor such objectives. The
confusion is convenient. It gives license for much discourse
100. Other meaningful ways of understanding the statement are conceiva-
ble. One might argue, for instance, that Nature or Providence or creative evolu-
tion intend the tool to be used for the purpose. Current tort theories, however,
do not seem inclined to provide the necessary theology or metaphysics to allow
statements about the "objectives" of tort law to be meaningful in any such
sense.
101. Some tort law theorists might extend this attribution of objectives be-
yond judges to legislatures, or perhaps even to the community at large. Since
the theorists have been less than explicit about what they mean when they say
tort law has certain objectives, it is difficult to know how broadly they might
define the group that ostensibly harbors such objectives. However, the larger
and more amorphous such a group becomes, the less plausible is the attribu-
tion of any particular objective to that group. Thus, the construction of the in-
strumental thesis discussed herein takes the thesis in its most plausible form.
102. The theorists might of course take a wholly different tack. They might
concede that their preferred objectives do not describe, in any meaningful
sense, the purpose of past or existing tort law, but then argue that such objec-
tives should be recognized as the goals of the law. Economic efficiency, it might
be argued, is a good thing, and tort law (appropriately modified) could promote
efficiency. Tort law thus should adopt efficiency as its objective. None of the
theorists, however, appears to make explicitly such a purely prescriptive argu-
ment. Rather, they base their theories on objectives that are presumed to en-
joy recognition already. See supra note 14. Nor is the theorists' adoption of this
position accidental. From a conception of instrumental rationality it is possible
to assess the rationality of means to an assumed end, but such a conception
provides no way to evaluate the rationality of ends. The ends must be taken as
given. See H. PuTNAM, supra note 12, at 168. If tort law was not created and
does not presently exist to promote efficiency, then instrumental rationality
can afford no basis for concluding that that criterion should become the "objec-
tive" of the law.
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based on such ghostly objectives. Once it is recognized, how-
ever, that only persons, and not doctrines or rules, can have
objectives, an embarrassing question arises: What evidence is
there that, in developing and applying tort doctrines, judges ac-
tually are animated in any systematic way by the purpose of
furthering extrinsic objectives?
2. Sizing up the evidence
Two possible sources of evidence are apparent. First,
judges might expressly acknowledge such objectives in judicial
opinions and jury instructions. Second, such objectives might
be inferred from what judges do-judicial decisions might be
explicable on the assumption that their authors intend the law
to achieve such objectives. 03
An examination of the language of negligence case law pro-
vides meager support for the theory that judges actually intend
the law to achieve broad extrinsic objectives. Although some
judicial opinions expressly acknowledge objectives, such as
economic efficiency,104 the majority do not. Indeed, the case
law discloses a veritable grab bag of principles, policies, and
rights, any of which may be invoked on an ad hoc basis. Al-
though opinions occasionally take note of efficiency considera-
tions, they also contain moral appeals,lOs pragmatic
observations, 0 6 and epigrammatic" flourishes.107 Such eclecti-
cism hardly bespeaks a commitment to anything that could ac-
curately be called an "objective."
Though unsupported by explicit acknowledgement, the
view that judges intend tort doctrine to advance definable so-
cial goals may rest on inference. Although some decisions may
103. See infra text accompanying notes 110-11.
-104. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1974);
Hendricks v. Peabody Coal Co., 115 Ill App. 2d 35, 45, 253 N.E.2d 56, 61 (1969).
105. See, e.g., Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 811, 532 P.2d 1226, 1231, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1975) (comparative negligence doctrine required by "all in-
telligent notions of fairness"); Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502, 506 (1871)
("The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence
to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such circumstances as to consti-
tute rashness in the judgment of prudent persons.").
106. See, e.g., Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 318-19, 83 N.E.2d
133, 135 (1948) ("Worlkmen such as the present plaintiff. who ply their liveli-
hoods on ladders and scaffolds, are scarcely in a position to protect themselves
from accident They usually have no choice but to work with the equipment at
hand, though danger looms large.").
107. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 343, 162 N.E. 99, 100
(1928) ("Life will have to be made over, and human nature transformed, before
prevision so extravagant can be accepted as the norm of conduct. .. ").
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support such an inference, however, the inference is difficult to
generalize. The very fact that most theorists are generally criti-
cal of existing tort law evidences the law's failure consistently
to promote theoretical objectives. To attribute an objective to
tort law by inference based on what the courts do, and then to
criticize the law and the courts for not serving that objective, is
manifestly circular.
3. The translation hypothesis: Do judges speak in code?
Although few negligence decisions explicitly invoke effi-
ciency analysis, 0 8 Judge Posner has maintained that, at least
during the period of his most detailed study, 1875-1905, negli-
gence law was best explained by the efficiency terms later
enunciated by Judge Learned Hand.10 9 He concedes that
courts rarely employ an economic vocabulary but argues that
people can perform economic analysis intuitively and that "eco-
nomic principles may be encoded in the ethical vocabulary that
is a staple of judicial language."" 0 The strength of the eco-
nomic thesis, according to Posner, is its explanatory power:
"The common law is best explained as if the judges who cre-
ated the law ... were trying to promote efficient resource
allocation.""'
Posner's thesis can be understood in two ways. He may
mean not that judges actually intend and understand economic
efficiency to be the objective of tort law, but only that the law
fits closely with what an economic analysis would prescribe.
Thus, economic analysis "explains" the law but does not de-
scribe the actual thinking or objectives of judges. By this con-
struction, of course, the thesis could have no prescriptive
power; this position would hold that economic theory happens
to match what judges have done. If judges decide to do some-
thing that does not match economic theory, then economic the-
ory will no longer describe tort law. That is all. If this is what
108. Even Judge Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), implies that the efficiency considerations expressed in
the Learned Hand test are not the only category of factors that may bear on the
determination of liability in negligence cases.
109. See Posner, Theory, supra note 3. The Learned Hand test is described
supra note 5.
110. Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 863.
111. Id. at 851 (emphasis added). Posner's contention that negligence doc-
trine is consistent with efficiency concerns has been widely questioned. See,
e.g., CALABRESI, CosTs, supra note 3; Rizzo, Law Amid Flux: The Economics of
Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 291 (1980); Schwartz,
Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697
(1978).
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Posner means, then even if his thesis is correct empirically it
would be misleading to describe efficiency as the "objective" of
tort law, since judges do not intend it to be such. 1 2
A stronger construction of Posner's thesis is that economic
theory describes not only what judges do but also what they
think-that the goal of economic efficiency, though perhaps not
fully articulated, is in some conscious or intuitive sense actu-
ally in the judges' minds. One test of this position is to ex-
amine more closely the vocabulary of negligence actually used
by judges in opinions and jury instructions to see whether the
doctrine might be serving as a "code" or "translation" for effi-
ciency considerations.
An examination of judicial language does not support the
"translation" thesis. For example, courts describe the requisite
level of "reasonable care" as a point on a rising slope--ex-
traordinary care above the level that is merely "reasonable" is
both possible and laudable,*13 and in a few instances may even
be mandatory." 4 Under the Posner-Hand test, by contrast,
"reasonable care" represents a peak, with declines on either
side. If ordinary care requires a person to avoid injuries up to
the point at which the cost of avoidance equals the cost of the
injury discounted by its probability of occurrence, then ex-
traordinary care would entail avoidance costs that exceed in-
jury costs and thus reduce efficiency. Consistent with this
conception, Posner asserts that the notion of extraordinary
care is economic "nonsense."115 Judicial language praising ex-
traordinary care thus leads to the obvious conclusion that if ex-
traordinary care is possible and desirable (even when not
legally required), then ordinary care must mean something
other than the Learned Hand test. Hence, an economist who
was selected as a juror and listened conscientiously to a stan-
dard negligence instruction might wistfully conclude that al-
though an efficiency test would be the most sensible way to
112. Posner might be content with this construction. He asserts at times
that his theory is purely positive and that he is "interested in explaining rather
than defending" tort law. Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 857. The overall
tone of Posner's work, however, such as his use of modifiers like "disturbingly"
to describe trends away from efficiency concerns, hi at 919, seems to belie his
profession of disinterestedness.
113. See, e.g., COMMrITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CALIFORNIA
JURy INSTRuCnoNs Cwn (BAR) BAJI No. 3.10 (6th ed. 1977).
114. Posner observes, for instance, that common carriers were traditionally
held to a higher standard of care. He suggests this deviation from ordinary
care was appropriate "[a]s an approximation to the likely understanding of the
parties to the contract of carriage." Posner, Theory, supra note 3, at 38.
115. Id.
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allocate liability, the jury was forbidden by law to adopt that
approach.
Judicial vocabulary and economic analysis also diverge on
the point of personification. Under economic analysis, the test
of negligence is abstract and impersonal."l 6 The question is
whether an action or decision is economically rational, and this
question can be translated into the "reasonable person" formu-
lation only on the assumption that a "reasonable person" is by
definition one who always acts "rationally." The vocabulary
used by courts, however, not only personifies the essential is-
sue but rejects the assumption that a "reasonable person" will
necessarily act rationally in every instance. A typical instruc-
tion concerning behavior in emergencies makes this clear: "It
is not a question of what was the safest or best thing to do, but
the question is what, under the circumstances, would a reason-
ably cautious and prudent person have done."" 7 Thus, instead
of translating efficiency analysis, the vocabulary emphasizes a
distinction that such analysis does not and perhaps could not
even make.
Such verbal discrepancies might be explained by importing
further complicating considerations such as information costs.
Like the defense of the Ptolemaic universe, however, the effort
to support the translation thesis, which defends the Learned
Hand test as a description of existing negligence law, must
eventually be cut off by Ockham's razor."18
4. Smiling at noncompliance: The significance of silence and
settlement
Perhaps the strongest evidence against the view that tort
116. The impersonal character of the issue for economic theory is evident in
the theory's statement of the negligence principle in formulaic terms that
would be indecipherable to the lay person, and probably to most lawyers and
judges as well. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 865, 869, 881.
117. 4 E. BRNSON, THE LAw OF INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 2322, at 377 (A.
Reid ed. 3d ed. 1962) (Washington instruction regarding acts in sudden peril or
emergency).
118. This description of the problems with the translation hypothesis is
hardly exhaustive. Professor Gary Schwartz points out additional contrary evi-
dence. Under the Learned Hand test, a defendant ought to be able to show that
his conduct was not negligent because, although he chose not to take safety
precautions that might have prevented the injury, the costs of such precautions
would have exceeded the injury costs. Schwartz observes, however, that in
practice, such an argument would be taken as a ground not for exonerating the
defendant but rather for imposing punitive damages. Schwartz, Deterrence and
Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 133, 151-53 (1982).
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law is intended by courts to serve extrinsic values lies in the
manifest reluctance of courts to invoke substantive tort doc-
trines at all. This reluctance is evident in the willingness of
courts to allow parties themselves to resolve disputes in virtu-
ally any way they choose. If an injured party chooses not to as-
sert a grievance, the legal system is quite content to leave well
enough alone.1 1 9 The system also allows, and in some in-
stances even requires, the injured party to contact the
tortfeasor before bringing an action in court, thus creating an
opportunity for early settlement.1 2 0 If, after the commence-
ment of a lawsuit, the parties settle and dismiss the action, the
court will recognize the dismissal without even reviewing the
terms of the settlement agreement.*21 Indeed, the evidentiary
exclusion protecting settlement discussions122 and the increas-
ing use of the pretrial conferenceM are designed to encourage
settlements. Moreover, the array of pretrial pleading and dis-
covery procedures is well-calculated to ensure both that the
parties can obtain the information necessary to work out a set-
tlement 24 and that they will have ample time to do so.125 Fi-
nally, even when a case has been tried and substantive
doctrine has been applied to resolve the dispute, the parties are
119. In fact, available evidence suggests that most of the injuries that result
from products, medical therapy, or other causes traditionally covered by the
law of torts never generate claims for compensation. See Best & Andreasen,
Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving De-
fects, Voicing Complaints and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAw AND Soc'y REv. 701,
701 (1977); Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Govern-
mental Regulation, 33 VAND. L REV. 1281, 1296 (1980).
120. For instance, prelawsuit notification requirements have been imposed
by statute in some states for medical malpractice claims. See, e.g., UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-14-8 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2 (1984).
121. FED. R. Crv. P. 41(a)(1); see also 9 C. WRiGHT, A. MILER & M KANE,
supra note 92, § 2363, at 159-60 (voluntary dismissal by stipulation of parties ef-
fective immediately and without judicial approval).
122. FED. R. EviD. 408. The advisory committee's note acknowledges that
the exclusion is based on "the public policy favoring the compromise and set-
tlement of disputes." FED. 1. EvD. 408 advisory committee note.
123. See FED. P. Civ. P. 16(a)(5) (expressly listing "facilitating the settle-
ment of the case" as one of the purposes of pretrial conferences); see also C.
WRIGHT, A. MLER & ML KAxE, supra note 92, § 1522, at 570 (noting even before
amendment of Rule 16 that "many judges regard promoting settlement as one
of the chief purposes of Rule 16").
124. Information that may facilitate settlement sometimes may be discover-
able even though it has no apparent relevance to any issue to be decided in the
case. See, e.g., Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 190-92, 429 P.2d 39, 40-41 (1967).
125. Available evidence shows that these devices and incentives are effec-
tive. For instance, the overwhelming majority of automobile accident cases are
settled before trial. See H. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF Cou'r 20 (1970); see also
Hunt, Negotiation and Settlement: An Insurer's View of Comparative Negli-
gence, 82 W. VA. L REv. 537, 537 (1980).
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allowed to modify that resolution at will. A prevailing party, for
example, may agree to accept partial performance of a judg-
ment, to modify the terms of the judgment, or to release the
judgment altogether.126
In addition to actively promoting out-of-court settlements,
the judicial system encourages private dispute resolution by
failing to adopt measures that would promote the judicial de-
termination of more grievances. For instance, courts could en-
courage the assertion of more grievances by liberalizing class
action and standing requirements. 2 7 Once actions have com-
menced, courts could refuse to permit stipulated dismissals
without reviewing the terms of the underlying settlement
agreements to determine whether those agreements are consis-
tent with the presumed objectives implicit in liability rules.1 28
That the legal system adopts none of these measures merely
confirms what few would question in any event: far from sim-
ply tolerating private resolutions of disputes, the law prefers
and actively encourages such resolutions.
This conclusion is hardly remarkable to one who views tort
law from an internal perspective. How better to ensure that a
resolution will not offend the parties' sense of fairness than to
let disputants resolve the controversy themselves?129 The sys-
126. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (5). See generally Little Rock Packing Co. v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1959) (validity and ef-
fect of a release endorsement on a draft given in payment of a judgment).
127. See generally Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REv.
937 (1975) (suggesting liberalization of class action, standing, and appealability
requirements if purpose of procedure is behavior modification and not just con-
flict resolution).
128. The appropriateness of judicial scrutiny of the terms of dismissal is al-
ready recognized in class actions and shareholder derivative suits. See FED. R.
Crv. P. 23(e), 23.1.
129. This is not to suggest that parties will always be satisfied entirely with
the results of settlement. Settlement requires compromises from both sides.
Nor are settlements voluntary in the fullest sense; the unpleasant alternative to
settlement, obviously, is litigation in a costly legal system. Thus, more perhaps
could be done to facilitate voluntary and amicable resolution of disputes. See
Recent Developments in Alternative Forms of Dispute Resolutions (ADR), 100
F.R.D. 512 (1983) (presentation in Judicial Conference for the Federal Circuit).
The point is simply that by settling, the parties manifest their preference for a
resolution on terms of their own making, and the law allows and encourages
the parties to settle on their own terms rather than insisting on the application
of substantive liability rules.
Another obvious reason for permitting settlements is the need to econo-
mize judicial resources. Although economy is no doubt a consideration that in
fact underlies the legal system's encouragement of settlements, it cannot be re-
garded as the only consideration. Settlement of civil cases, though perhaps
analagous to plea bargaining in the criminal process, is not an exact counter-
part. Whereas plea bargaining is widely viewed with suspicion, and tolerated
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tem's overwhelming preference for private resolution, however,
is difficult to explain if its objective is to promote independent
goals through the application of substantive tort doctrines. If
these doctrines are crafted to promote efficiency or individual
autonomy in society, their evasion should not be so freely per-
mitted and promoted.130
An instrumentalist might respond that although the legal
system formally decides only a miniscule portion of the uni-
verse of tort disputes under established liability rules, these
rules nonetheless determine the content of the much larger
number of private settlements. Parties may predict the prob-
able outcome of formal adjudication and then settle on the
same terms to avoid incurring the expense of litigation. Settle-
ments thus would be consistent with the objectives encapsu-
lated in the rules.131
If the predicted outcome were the only factor affecting the
content of settlement agreements, this instrumentalist re-
sponse would be cogent. Numerous other factors, however,
enter into settlement decisions. Such factors include the desire
of one or both parties to avoid the emotional and financial bur-
dens of litigation, the parties' financial condition, the tax conse-
quences of various settlement alternatives, pertinent insurance
provisions and practices, the personalities and negotiating
skills of the parties and counsel, the interest and fee arrange-
ments of the parties' counsel, and the parties' innate sense of
only because of necessity, see Comment, Constitutional Alternatives to Plea
Bargaining: A New Waive, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 327 (1984), settlement is not gen-
erally viewed with similar suspicion or reluctance, see Gifford, Meaningful Re-
form of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILI. L.
REv. 37,52 ("Compromise in plea bargaining is not analogous to compromise in
settlement talks."). But see infra note 130.
130. In an article appearing after this Article was submitted for publication,
Professor Fiss criticizes the increasingly apparent movement towards settle-
ment and nonjudicial methods of dispute resolution. Fiss, Against Settlemen4
93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984). Fiss's criticisms are varied and need not be summa-
rized here. Consistent with this Article, however, Fiss argues that a preference
for settlement necessarily assumes that adjudication is primarily or wholly "a
process to resolve disputes" I&L at 1075. iss opposes settlement precisely be-
cause he does not accept that assumption. See supra note 49. "[The law ex-
ists] not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the
peace, but to explicate and give force to... [public) values and to bring reality
into accord with them. This duty is not discharged when the parties settle."
Fiss, supra at 1085.
131. Posner, for example, discusses settlements as if they were probability-
adjusted predictions of the results that would obtain under liability rules. See
RM PosNER, supra note 50, at 337-42.
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what is reasonable or fair.132 Thus, even though applicable lia-
bility rules may be one factor influencing a settlement, and per-
haps even the single most important factor, the effect of other
concerns nonetheless may cause the settlement to deviate dra-
matically from the result that a liability rule (and its presumed
objective) might have prescribed. 33
An instrumentalist might also argue that private settle-
ments are encouraged because they further the law's substan-
tive objectives more effectively than do the liability rules
themselves. This argument may seem especially congenial to
efficiency theorists who view accident law as a substitute for
the market, 34 necessary only because lack of information and
high transaction costs prevent the market from operating.
These economic theorists might suggest that out-of-court settle-
ments are properly favored because they more nearly approxi-
mate a market solution to the problem of accidents.
This position is similarly vulnerable, however, because set-
tlement considerations between individual parties after an acci-
dent has occurred in no sense simulate the ideal market
transactions that, in theory, would lead to an optimum level of
accident prevention costs. In reality, settlements may be
shaped by all of the factors already discussed, factors that are
132. One commentator has described the tendency of accident victims to
settle for compensation well below the costs of an accident:
This pattern results from a combination of factors, including the vic-
tim's desperate and immediate need for money, the uncertainty of suc-
cess in pursuing a tort remedy, the cost of processing a tort claim, and,
above all, the amount of time required to obtain any compensation
through judicial resolution of a contested claim. The victim (or the vic-
tim's survivor) often has little choice but to be content with a combina-
tion of benefits from external sources, such as social welfare and first
party insurance, supplemented by a few thousand dollars in settlement
of a disputed tort claim.
Pierce, supra note 119, at 1296.
133. Controlled experiments using simulated settlements appear to confirm
this analysis. In one experiment, twenty pairs of practicing lawyers in Des
Moines, Iowa, were assigned to represent the opposing parties in the same hy-
pothetical personal injury case. The lawyers were given considerable time to
prepare and to conduct settlement negotiations and were told that the results
of the exercise would be published with lawyers' names attached. Thus, the
participants had both the time and incentive to make reasonable efforts to set-
tle on terms favorable to their clients. In fact, settlement figures ranged from
$95,000 all the way down to $15,000, and the other settlements were described as
"scattered almost randomly between the two extremes." G. WiLLIAMs, LEGAL
NEGOTIATIONS AND SETrLEMENT 5-7 (1983). Such apparently random results, oc-
curring in cases based on identical facts and legal rules, hardly reflect a system
in which settlement results are determined or strongly controlled by liability
rules.
134. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 50, at 325; Posner, Theory, supra note 3,
at 52.
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simply not based on the same concerns that animate theories
of efficient resource allocation. Suppose, for example, that
"Manufacturer" makes a product that causes one hundred inju-
ries to consumers each year, of an average severity valued at
$100,000, so that the sum of injury costs is $10 million. The inci-
dence of injury is unaffected by the consumers' behavior, and
there are no practicable substitutes for the product. Manufac-
turer, however, could eliminate all these injuries by adding a
safety device to the product at a total cost of $9 million. Thus,
from a societal standpoint the more efficient decision for Manu-
facturer would be to add the safety device.
Theoretically, in a perfect market, the consumers of Manu-
facturer's product would bargain with Manufacturer to add the
safety device. Since transaction and information costs prevent
such bargaining, however, assume that the legal system adopts
a rule, such as negligence or strict liability, imposing liability
for such injuries on Manufacturer, who theoretically now has a
$10 million incentive to spend the $9 million necessary to make
a safe product. Suppose, however, Manufacturer decides not to
install the device, but instead negotiates settlements (costing
Manufacturer $7 million) with injured consumers who are in-
duced to accept such settlements because they need quick
cash, dislike litigation, have timid lawyers, or for any number of
other reasons. Thus, although paying out $7 million in settle-
ments, Manufacturer nonetheless saves two million dollars by
making what is, from a societal viewpoint, an inefficient
decision.
In this illustration, as in similar situations, the considera-
tions that influenced the settlement negotiations between Man-
ufacturer and the injured consumers after the accidents
occurred are not necessarily the same considerations that, in a
perfect market, would have influenced negotiations before any
accidents happened. Out-of-court settlements, therefore, do
not approximate judicial solutions that economic tort theorists
would view as furthering the tort law's substantive objectives
by resembling true market solutions.
The example also illustrates that the encouragement of pri-
vate tort settlements, such as those between Manufacturer and
the injured consumers, may nullify the incentive to make safe
products. Moreover, even assuming that insurance will spread
the $3 million of loss now borne by individual consumers
among all consumers, the same transaction and information
costs that previously prevented the injured consumers from
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uniting to negotiate with Manufacturer continue to exist.
Whereas without a liability rule the consumers in the illustra-
tion would absorb all $10 million in loss, they now suffer less
than a third of that loss, thanks to the combined effect of the
liability rule and the availability of private settlements. Thus,
the consumers now have even less incentive to find ways of
overcoming or reducing the transaction and information costs
that prevent them from bargaining with Manufacturer.
The conclusion is inescapable: if the legal system is truly
committed to achieving efficiency through liability rules, it
should forbid private settlements that deviate from those rules.
The fact that the system has adopted precisely the opposite at-
titude toward such settlements seriously undermines the in-
strumentalist contention that the persons who make and
administer the law intend it to serve such an objective in any
systematic way.
As noted earlier, however, the express and inferential evi-
dence suggests that at least some judges on some occasions are
influenced in their decisions by extrinsic values such as effi-
ciency. If this occasional influence does not elevate such val-
ues to the status of "objectives" that can support a general
conception of instrumental rationality, it nonetheless poses a
problem. What is the relation between tort law and the extrin-
sic values that the courts invoke, however erratically, in sup-
port of their decisions? The conception of rhetorical rationality
suggests a plausible answer.
B. THE RHETORICAL USE OF ExTRiNsic VALUES
From an internal perspective, substantive doctrine has a
rhetorical function. It allows courts to justify decisions by giv-
ing reasons that are responsive to the litigants' sense of fair-
ness. Under negligence law, the central concept of
"reasonableness" imposes no a priori standard dictating what
kinds of reasons are admissible. The law, therefore, supports a
diversity of reasons. One form of justificatory reasoning can be
labeled "ethical generalization." This form of reasoning is
based on the notion that the correctness of an action or deci-
sion can be determined by projecting what the results would be
if the action or decision became a general norm-what would
the world be like if everyone acted this way?
Perhaps the purest example of "ethical generalization" is
Kant's formulation of the "categorical imperative." Kant ad-
vised: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become
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through your will a universal law of nature. "13 Generalization
is not confined, however, to philosophy. Reasoning by general-
ization is a common method of persuasion. Civic leaders often
persuade citizens to vote by asking, "What kind of democracy
would we have if everyone decided that it was not worthwhile
to vote?" Moralists also resort to generalization when they dis-
approve of some seemingly private predilection on the ground
that a society in which that predilection were widespread
would be a bad society.136
Generalization, however, does not operate by persuading
an individual that one person's actions or decisions will actu-
ally have any general effect. If I tell you that you should vote
because, "What if everyone decided that it is not worthwhile to
vote?" I am not necessarily suggesting that what you do will
have the slightest influence on anyone else's decision to vote or
not. 37 The generalization is purely hypothetical. The argu-
ment works by assuming that the generalization somehow il-
luminates the inherent correctness of your individual decision.
The concept of ethical generalization offers an explanation
of the role of extrinsic values in adjudication. From an internal
perspective, a judge's objective is simply to resolve a dispute in
accordance with the litigants' sense of fairness. Even if the
judge believes personally in the importance of extrinsic values,
such as economic efficiency or individual autonomy, decisions
in individual lawsuits between occasional litigants who fail to
reach settlements seem an unlikely vehicle for implementing
or imposing such values.138 Nonetheless, such values may pro-
vide a powerful tool for justifying particular results. If the
judge can explain convincingly, for instance, the undesirable
economic consequences that would follow if the defendant's
135. H. PATON, THE MORAL LAW; OR, KANT'S GROUNDWORK OF THE MrTA-
PHYSIC OF MORALS 89 (1950) (emphasis in original).
136. See, e.g., P. DEvLIN, supra note 45, at 113 ("[Wihile a few people getting
drunk in private cause no problem at all, widespread drunkenness, whether in
private or public, would create a social problem.").
137. Of course, if it is assumed that your action will influence others, then
my argument to you is even more powerful.
138. See Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARv.
L REV. 1717, 1718 (1982) (arguing that the social consequences of common law
tort and contract rules are negligible). Moreover, given the complexity of the
out-of-court world, it is likely that if a decision does have a significant effect be-
yond the individual lawsuit, that effect may be much different than simple pro-
jection of the decision itself would indicate. See Henderson, supra note 10, at
1038 (arguing that safety-inspired imposition of strict liability on a product area
may result in price increases, thus forcing marginal consumers to turn to sub-
stitutes that are even riskier).
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conduct became pervasive, then a decision imposing liability on
the defendant is justified. This is true not because anyone ex-
pects the decision necessarily to have an impact on conduct
generally,139 but because the method of generalization is a com-
mon way of determining the correctness of an individual's
conduct.
From this viewpoint, extrinsic values are not the objectives
of tort law but are useful tools to courts in performing their pri-
mary function in tort cases, that of resolving disputes. There is,
however, no reason to assume that disputants are committed to
any one extrinsic value or to any single mode or style of ration-
alization. Moral, 'economic, and practical considerations may
all be pertinent in justifying a decision. Thus, a court con-
cerned with the litigants' sense of fairness might draw on any
available rhetoric in supporting its results. From this perspec-
tive, extrinsic economic and moral values (and theories based
on those values) may be significant not because they can sup-
ply any instrumental standard for evaluating tort law, but
rather because they contribute to the variety of rationales
available to courts in rendering decisions fair. The fertility of
the negligence doctrine in absorbing the rhetoric of such theo-
ries may well be one of the doctrine's most important
virtues.14o
V. NEGLIGENCE AND THE FORMAL VIRTUES
A. NEGLIGENCE AND LOGICAL RATIONALITY
According to Professor Henderson, negligence offends the
ideal of rationality because it does not allow courts to apply law
139. Again, if the litigants or judge believe the decision will have an impact
on conduct generally, then reasoning based on generalization will be even more
persuasive.
140. Its rhetorical fecundity allows negligence law to develop and deploy vo-
cabularies adapted to particular kinds of controversies. Cases involving prod-
uct-related injuries, for example, commonly require that decisions be justified
in terms comprehensible to business defendants who think in economic terms.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the economic concepts of loss spreading and
of allocating losses so as to create incentives to reduce accident costs are most
conspicuously invoked in such decisions. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Es.
cola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring). One commentator has suggested that strict liability,
as developed by the courts, is merely an adaptation of negligence concepts with
a vocabulary more suitable for particular classes of cases. See Schwartz, supra
note 7, at 970-77.
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to facts and reach decisions that are logically necessary.141 The
determination of whether a particular defendant's conduct was
"reasonable" requires the judge or jury to exercise discretion.
Assuming for a moment the validity of this assessment, the ob-
vious question arises: Why should courts be restricted to nec-
essary forms of reasoning?
One answer Henderson suggests focuses on institutional
competence. Although problems not conducive to logical reso-
lution may be amenable to managerial solutions, 42 the legal
process is ill-equipped to provide such solutions.143 This an-
swer, however, encounters serious obstacles. Why the legal
process is unsuitable for developing managerial solutions is not
clear. In a lawsuit, all interested parties argue for the solution
they think advisable, and courts routinely hear expert testi-
mony on issues where expertise is needed. Henderson con-
cedes that courts can deal with managerial problems and that
they are increasingly doing so.14 Given that such problems
may often be difficult for any decision maker, it is unclear why
the legal process is especially ill-adapted for the task.145
Regardless of the managerial competence the law may or
may not have, however, a concern for limiting the law to its
area of competence moves away from the purely formal con-
ception of rationality and toward a more pragmatic inquiry re-
garding the kinds of problems courts are actually equipped to
resolve. The inquiry has little to do with the necessary charac-
ter of the reasoning involved. As noted earlier, no purely logi-
cal method can be devised to move from observation, '"ary
was zigzagging from lane to lane," to the conclusion, "Mary was
driving unreasonably." Yet a typical judge or juror not only
would reach that conclusion, but would feel that the conclusion
141. Henderson's position and its difficulties in interpretation are discussed
more fully supra notes 4-8.
142. Henderson, supra note 10, at 908-10.
143. Henderson, supra note 7, at 476-77.
144. Henderson concedes that "judicially-implemented management deci-
sions... might be legitimate when they are limited to suits seeking injunctive
relief in the public law sector." Henderson, supra note 10, at 910 n.41. Thus,
Henderson admits that courts are capable of rendering managerial-type deci-
sions, that they are increasingly doing so, that such decisions may be rational
in some sense, and that such decisions may be legitimate in some kinds of
cases. In view of these concessions, the assertion that a deviation from logical
rationality in private tort cases would be illegitimate hardly seems obvious.
145. Some scholars have argued that courts are quite capable of dealing
with such problems. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 36, at 2-4, 17; see also Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L Rv. 1281, 1307-10
(1976). For a recent and more skeptical assessment, see Resnick, supra note 85,
at 399-400, 406-408, 414-16.
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was not in any sense "discretionary." There are, of course, cer-
tain problems to which single inexorable answers can be
given, 4 6 but such problems may be well beyond the compre-
hension of the ordinary judge or juror. From the standpoint of
institutional competence, the critical question is whether a
problem is in fact amenable to solution through the judicial
process, not whether it has certain formal characteristics.
This analysis may misconstrue Henderson's point. Hender-
son implies that necessary reasoning is imperative because it is
part of the essence of the legal process. Adjudication means
making decisions through a process in which the affected par-
ties are guaranteed the opportunity to offer reasons and in
which the decision must be based on reasons. 1 47 Thus, Hender-
son's argument may mean that regardless of whether courts
are capable of dealing with problems in nonformal, managerial
ways, they should not do so because if they did they would not
be acting like courts.
Thus restated, however, Henderson's argument simply re-
turns to the question that the first formulation failed to answer.
Granting that courts should act like courts and that adjudica-
tion is in its essence a process which assures parties the right
to give and obtain a decision based on reasons, there still is no
apparent basis for requiring such "reasons" to have any partic-
ular formal character. Indeed, Henderson's insistence on the
necessary character of legal reasoning turns his own argument
against itself. His definition of adjudication actually contains
two elements: assured participation and rationality. 4 8 Al-
though Henderson states these elements as if they were a sin-
gle descriptor, they clearly are not. Trial by battle provides
assured participation but not rationality,149 and an inquisitorial
system might strive for rationality without guaranteeing partic-
ipation.150 To be sure, the two elements may be mutually sup-
portive. Participation may include giving reasons. Under
146. For example, problems involving mathematical equations may fall
within this limited category.
147. Henderson, supra note 7, at 469.
148. See id.
149. See S. MILSOM, ISTolucAL FOuNDAnON OF THE COMMON LAw 111 (1969)
("IT]he battle is a magical test of the demandant's right.").
150. For a brief description of the inquisitorial system, see P. DEvUN, supra
note 45, at 57. The point is that an inquisitorial system could operate without
assuring participation by the persons affected, not that such systems must or
do in fact operate in that way. Cf. J. MERRYMAN, THE Civn. LAW TRADMON 124
(1969) (arguing that characterization of civil law as "inquisitorial" is misleading
and that in civil law systems the parties, not the judge, usually determine the
issues, evidence, and arguments).
[Vol. 69:277
NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE
Henderson's conception of rationality, however, the elements
become not only distinct, but antagonistic.
Imagine, for example, a dispute involving a problem that
cannot be solved through the logical application of a rule,
either because the problem is intrinsically not susceptible of a
logical solution or because an adequate rule has not yet been
formulated. In that case, which of the elements of adjudication
takes priority? If a court recognizes the parties' right to pres-
ent their dispute for resolution, it commits itself to a process
that, in Henderson's view, will not be rational. If, however, the
court refuses to consider the dispute because it cannot be re-
solved rationally, the parties will be denied their right of partic-
ipation. 5 1 The problem is not exceptional. Negligence law is
applicable precisely to those disputes in which more definite
statutory or contractual guidance has not been provided.
The dilemma underscores the futility of seeking to confine
the legal process to any formal conception of rationality. If the
insistence on logical rationality is relaxed, however, the di-
lemma dissolves. The parties may raise their dispute and pres-
ent any reasons, whether or not founded on formal logic,
pertinent to it. Since most people in their daily experience are
accustomed to giving and receiving reasons without subjecting
such reasons to review under the canons of formal logic, there
is little risk that such a process will be seen as a breach of
"rationality."152
151. Henderson might argue that no right has been denied if there is no
proceeding in which the parties might participate, but this would trivialize the
participation right. Certainly that right means at least that the parties are as-
sured of a forum to which they can bring their disputes for peaceable
resolution.
152. Indeed, the rigidly rule-based legal system is itself likely to be per-
ceived as offending rationality. The spectacle of harried pro se litigants who,
innocent of legal concepts and categories, attempt to go to court and simply ex-
plain their positions emphasizes the problem. To the lay person, the law may
often seem to focus on technicalities that do not matter while systematically re-
fusing to consider the factors that do. Consider, for example, the following ob-
servation in Swifts Gulliver's Travels:
In pleading, they [lawyers] studiously avoid entering inio the Afer-
its of the Cause, but are loud, violent, and tedious in dwelling upon all
Circumstances which are not to the Purpose. For instance, in the Case
already mentioned; they never desire to know what Claim or Title my
Adversary hath to my Cow, but whether the said Cow were Red or
Black, her Horns long or short- whether the Field I graze her in be
round or square, whether she was milked at home or abroad, what Dis-
eases she is subject to, and the like; after which they consult "Prece-
dents," adjourn the Cause from Time to Time, and in Ten, Twenty, or
Thirty Years come to an issue.
J. SwFT, GuLLvER's TRAvELs, Part IV, ch.5, at 352-53 (Oxford Univ. Press 1926)
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B. NEGLIGENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW
Henderson also endorses a variant version of rationality
that can be described as "rule of law." This conception re-
quires that the law be clear and comprehensible so that indi-
viduals can understand and conform to it.153 Negligence
doctrine is suspect in this view because it is apparently too in-
determinate to allow individuals to understand what is re-
quired of them and to make intelligent decisions consistent
with those requirements. 154 Although this criticism focuses on
the need to promote rationality in individuals' out-of-court con-
duct, its implications may also be important for an internal per-
spective. If disputes are decided by imposing liability on
individuals for conduct that they could not have known was un-
lawful or improper, their sense of fairness will likely be
violated.
Unlike the conception of logical rationality, the "rule of
law" conception properly focuses on the actual ability of
human beings to comprehend and comply with a rule, rather
than on the rule's formal characteristics. Once this shift in fo-
cus occurs, however, the criticism of negligence doctrine loses
much of its force. Everyone who lives in a community has an
opportunity to form an impression regarding the kinds of con-
duct that are considered ordinary and appropriate. By con-
trast, few people trouble themselves to become acquainted
with the formal law. 55 And however indefinite the concept of
"reasonableness" may be from a purely analytical standpoint, it
probably is more comprehensible to the lay person than a legal
specification of criteria of liability. Consequently, the ability of
most individuals to understand and conform their conduct to
societal requirements would probably be reduced rather than
enhanced if the negligence concept of reasonableness were re-
placed by a more formalized definition of the conditions of
liability.156
Moreover, even if negligence doctrine involved a sacrifice of
comprehensibility, Henderson's attempt to import "rule of law"
analysis into tort law seems questionable. Fostering certainty
is a task that is more urgent in some spheres of activity than in
153. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
154. See Henderson, supra note 7, at 478-80.
155. See Schwartz, supra note 111, at 710-11.
156. Fuller himself suggests that the concept of "due care" is satisfactory
because it incorporates "common sense standards of judgment." L FULLE,
MoRAnT, supra note 31, at 64. He adds: "A specious clarity can be more dam-
aging than an honest open-ended vagueness." Id.
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others. Tort law by its nature is primarily concerned with the
accidental and the unexpected, with happenings that are not
the anticipated result of any deliberative decision. 5 7 The case
for requiring clear rules to enable individuals to determine with
precision what occurrences will or will not lead to liability
seems weakened when those occurrences are by hypothesis
unanticipated. 58
In addition, the "rule of law" philosophy is most compelling
against the backdrop of conflicts pitting the individual against
the potentially oppressive state. This backdrop is apparent in
the contrasts that Fuller frequently draws between the rule of
law and the practices of Nazi Germany.159 In such conflicts, the
rule of law not only allows the individual to avoid punishment
by understanding and conforming to the law, but also protects
against abuses of legal mechanisms by the state. Tort law,
however, is far removed from that context. The litigants in tort
cases are typically private parties, and the state, if involved at
all, will likely as not be a defendant. Moreover, the source of
controversy is usually an accident or injury that the parties
would have preferred to avoid altogether. As the threat of sys-
tematic oppression of defendants is negligible in tort cases, the
need for strict formal safeguards to prevent such oppression is
accordingly diminished.
This is not to say that the rule of law has no place in tort
actions. From an internal perspective, the idea of law is a pow-
erful tool in rendering decisions palatable to opposing litigants.
The fundamental concept that decisions must be rendered in
157. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 111, at 717 (observing that contributory negli-
gence typically arises in situations in which the victim was oblivious to the
risk).
158. Manufacturers of products, or other potential defendants engaged in
large-scale activities, may constitute an exception to this assertion. Though
such entities may not anticipate injuries in connection with any particular
product or action, they realize that a certain number of injuries will result from
their activities. The Fuller-Henderson conception of 'Yule of law," however, is
not attuned to the problems of large-scale or organizational injurers in any
event. That conception is concerned with protecting the individual who wishes
to avoid liability, not the corporation that wishes to estimate the cost of liability
as a business expense. See Fiss, supra note 36, at 43-44 (criticizing Fuller's
analysis for ignoring the fact that individuals have largely been replaced as liti-
gants by corporations and bureaucracies). Moreover, insofar as the business
corporation's calculations merely require probabilistic estimates of future lia-
bility costs, an indeterminate rule simply adds another factor to the already un-
certain calculus. But cf. Rodgers, supra note 2, at 14-20 (arguing that rational
injurers should be subject to an objective standard and strict liability, whereas
nonrational injurers should be judged under a subjective standard).
159. L. FuttER, MoRAir=r, supra note 31, at 40 n.2, 54-55, 123, 158.
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accordance with law works to ensure that all persons will be
treated in the same way and in accordance with principles that
are open to public scrutiny, rather than being subject to the un-
guided will of individual officials.160 Law also creates the possi-
bility of conflict with other components of dispute resolution,
however. Thus, the application of general principles of law may
prevent consideration of the unique circumstances and equities
of individual cases. 161 Moreover, a rigid system of laws may be
unresponsive to variations in popular values and beliefs that
may occur from one period or community to another.162
The doctrine of negligence seeks to resolve this dilemma
by creating a rule of decision that can be applied uniformly but
that is sufficiently open-ended that its actual content can be fil-
led in for each particular case. As a prospective defendant,
every person must always act under the same "reasonable per-
son" standard. The meaning of that standard is not fixed, but
must be established for each case. Thus, the negligence doc-
trine permits disputes to be resolved in a way that has at least
the form of law, and yet avoids any glaring divergence between
the law and the values of litigants and the community.
The "reasonableness" concept thus seeks to satisfy the
general requirements of rule of law while remaining responsive
to the need to resolve individual disputes. In a different area of
the law, such as criminal law, this accommodation might well
be unacceptable.163 However, given the efficacy of "reasonable-
ness" as a practical guide for individual behavior, and in view
of the attenuated demands of rule of law in tort law disputes,
the accommodation seems satisfactory in that context.
160. The idea that decisions are made in accordance with "law" has been a
powerful legitimating force in the Anglo-American legal culture. See generally
F. HAYEK, THE CONsT1rriON OF LIBERTY (1960); see also P. DEVLIN, supra note
45, at 85. The critical importance of subjecting governmental institutions to law
is reflected in many of the most celebrated of our constitutional protections, in-
cluding the "due process" guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
161. The conflict between law and equity has long and often been noted.
See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics bk. V, ch. 10, in THE NICHOMACHEAN
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 132-34 (D. Ross trans. 1925); P. DEVLIN, supra note 45, at
84; R. WASSERSTROM, supra note 29, at 84-117.
162. The problem of adapting law to changing needs and values occupies a
substantial portion of scholarly legal discourse. For a recent innovative consid-
eration of this problem, see G. CALABRESI, supra note 84.
163. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974) (legislature re-
quired to establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement in noncom-
mercial contexts); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (laws
must provide explicit standards for those who apply them in order to avoid
subjective enforcement).
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CONCLUSION
Much recent tort scholarship can be viewed as a quest to
subject tort law to a precise conception of rationality. The bur-
den of this Article is that the quest is futile. In law, as in phi-
losophy and science, rationality breaks out of conceptual
prisons. 64 Thus, the most useful conception-what this Article
has called "rhetorical rationality"--is hardly a conception at all.
It simply means that in law, as in life, decisions and deeds
should be based on reasons. The reasons, however, may come
in any variety of forms.
For the legal scholar, this conclusion is perhaps disap-
pointing. Scholarship seeks to understand and to expound, and
it is a happy circumstance when the subject of study has an in-
herent solidity that is susceptible to refined understanding and
eloquent exposition. For the judge, however, whose job is to
apply the law in resolving real disputes between real people,
precision in the law may be less imperative; in some instances,
it may even be a hindrance. And when disputes raise problems
that have not been brought under statutory or contractual gov-
ernance, an elemental "reasonableness" may well be the most
useful judicial artifact thus far devised.
164. See EL PuTmAm, supra note 12, at 174-200.
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